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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Constitution expressly preempts all forms of taxation
to the state except ad valorem taxation of real property and tangible
personal property.1 The authority to levy those taxes is reserved to
the various counties, municipalities, local school districts, and spe* Associate, Hopping Green Sams & Smith, P.A., Tallahassee, Fla. B.S., Florida
State University, 1992; J.D., Florida State University, 1995.
1. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a).
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cial districts in the state.2 These governmental entities rely heavily
on the revenue generated through ad valorem taxation to carry out
their constitutional and statutory mandates. 3 In fact, more than
$11.6 billion was raised through ad valorem taxes in fiscal year
1995-96.4 The Florida Constitution also establishes the parameters
for valuing property subject to ad valorem taxation. Specifically, article VII, section 4 directs the Legislature to prescribe regulations
“which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem
taxation.”5 Pursuant to this mandate, the Legislature has established the process by which county property appraisers are to assess
all property subject to ad valorem taxation.6 An important component of this valuation process is the procedure that enables taxpayers to seek administrative and judicial review of the property appraiser’s assessment of their property.7 The purpose of this review is
to ensure that the property appraiser’s assessment accurately reflects a “just valuation” of the taxpayer’s property.
Taxpayers have argued that this ability to seek review of the assessment is meaningless because of the deference which is afforded
to the property appraiser’s assessment. The scope of this deference is
best illustrated by the burden of proof that taxpayers must overcome
when challenging the property appraiser’s assessment. To prevail,
2. See id. § 9; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 125.01(1)(r), (5)(c), 166.211(1), 190.011(13),
236.25, 373.503 (1997).
3. The percentage of total county revenue generated by ad valorem taxes is 29.5%.
See FLA. JT. LEGIS. COMM. ON INTERGOVTL. REL., FEATURES OF FLORIDA’S LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCES 3-11 (Table 3.1) (1997) (available at Fla. Dep’t of Revenue (DOR),
Tallahassee, Fla.) (fiscal year 1994-95) [hereinafter LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
REPORT]. For water management districts, ad valorem taxes make up 58.2% of total revenue. See id. For school districts, ad valorem taxes make up 43.1% of total revenues. See
FLA. JT. ADVIS. COUNCIL ON INTERGOVTL. REL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES IN
FLORIDA: SUMMARY 21 (1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (fiscal year 199495) [hereinafter LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE SUMMARY]. Ad valorem taxes also constitute a significant portion of the revenues of municipalities and special districts. See LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCES REPORT, supra, at 3-11 (Table 3.1) (listing 16.1% for municipalities and 15.3% for special districts); see also FLA. JT. ADVIS. COUNCIL ON INTERGOVTL.
REL., AD VALOREM PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENTS: RELEVANT ISSUES AND INFORMATION 5-6,
Fig. I-IV (1995) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (fiscal year 1992-93 data)
[hereinafter PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT].
4. See FLA. LEGIS., 1996 FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK 125 (1996) (available at Fla. Jt.
Legis. Mgmt. Comm., Div. of Legis. Library Servs., Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter 1996
FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK]. This figure has grown significantly over the last 20 years. See
id.
5. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (emphasis added). The aggregate taxable value of all
property in Florida subject to ad valorem taxation was over $650 billion as of January 1,
1996. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 8 (Fig. A). Real property comprised just under $500 billion of this figure. See id.
6. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 193, 195, 196 (1997); see also discussion infra Part
II.A.
7. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 194 (1997); see also discussion infra Part II.B.; Steve
Pajcic et al., Truth or Consequences: Florida Opts for Truth in Millage in Response to the
Proposition 13 Syndrome , 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 593, 608, 618-21 (1980).
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the taxpayer must disprove “every reasonable hypothesis of a legal
assessment.”8 The perceived inequity of this standard led some taxpayers to call for its repeal.9
Representative Bob Starks10 and Senator Jim Horne11 responded
to these concerns by introducing bills in 1996 12 and again in 199713
that would ease the burden that taxpayers must overcome when
challenging the property appraiser’s assessment. During the 1997
Regular Session, the Legislature approved legislation that accomplished this goal by reducing the taxpayer’s burden of proof to
“preponderance of the evidence” or “clear and convincing evidence”
depending upon the circumstances surrounding the property appraiser’s assessment.14
This Article describes the history of this legislation and discusses
the potential impact of these new burdens of proof. Part II provides
the backdrop for the 1997 legislation. Part III traces the history of
the 1997 legislation. Part IV discusses the new standard implemented by the 1997 legislation. Finally, in Part V, the author concludes that if the new section 194.301 is implemented equitably, the
statute will satisfy the constitutional mandate to assess “just valuation.” At the same time, the statute will ameliorate perceived inequities in the former system.
II. OVERVIEW OF AD VALOREM TAXATION IN FLORIDA AND
BACKGROUND OF THE 1997 LEGISLATION
For the most part, ad valorem taxation in Florida 15 is carried out
on the local level,16 and the county property appraisers play a central
8. This standard can be traced to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Folsom v.
Bank of Greenwood, 97 Fla. 426, 430, 120 So. 317, 318 (1929); see also discussion infra
Part II.C.
9. This issue is not unique to Florida. In 1982, the Texas Legislature reduced the
burden that taxpayers must overcome when challenging the property appraiser’s assessment to a preponderance of the evidence. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.26 (West 1997); see
also FLA. JT. ADVIS. COUNCIL ON INTERGOVTL. REL., COMPARISON OF AD VALOREM TAX
SYSTEMS OF FLORIDA, CALIFORNIA, GEORGIA, ILLINOIS & TEXAS, 4 n.2 (1996) (available at
Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented to Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force on Sept.
12, 1996) [hereinafter COMPARISON OF TAX SYSTEMS]. Prior to this legislative action, taxpayers in Texas were required to demonstrate that the assessment was “grossly excessive”
or that it “shock[ed] a correct mind.” COMPARISON OF TAX SYSTEMS, supra, at 5 (citing
Hayes Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Valero Transmission Co., 645 S.W.2d 542, 547 n.1 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983)).
10. Repub., Casselberry.
11. Repub., Orange Park.
12. See Fla. HB 557 (1996); Fla. SB 740 (1996).
13. See Fla. HB 445 (1997); Fla. SB 134 (1997).
14. Act effective May 23, 1997, ch. 97-85, 1997 Fla. Laws 503, 504 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 194.301 (1997)).
15. The intent of Part II is to acquaint the reader with those issues that are relevant
to the development of the 1997 “burden of proof” legislation. It is not the intent of this
Part to provide a detailed or comprehensive discussion of Florida’s ad valorem tax process.
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role in this process.17 In this regard, the property appraiser is
“charged with determining the value of all property within the
county [and] with maintaining certain records connected therewith.”18 The primary records that the property appraiser is required
to maintain are the assessment rolls.19 These rolls contain a list of all
property in the county subject to ad valorem taxation and the taxable value20 of that property.21 A separate roll must be maintained
for real property and for tangible personal property. 22 The Department of Revenue (DOR) has adopted rules that prescribe the form of,
and information to be contained in, the assessment rolls. 23 Each roll
must be submitted to DOR for review and approval.24
For a more comprehensive overview of ad valorem taxation in Florida, see generally 2
FLORIDA BAR, TAX SECTION, FLORIDA STATE AND LOCAL TAXES (1998) [hereinafter FLORIDA
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES].
16. As discussed in Part II, the property subject to ad valorem taxation is appraised,
or valued, by the county property appraiser. Millage rates are determined and the taxes
are levied by the various local taxing authorities within the county. There is, however,
state oversight of this ad valorem tax process. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text.
17. The property appraiser is a “constitutional officer.” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d);
see District Sch. Bd. v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272, 276 (Fla. 1973). This fact limits the Legislature’s ability to interfere with the exercise of the property appraiser’s discretion. See id. at
277. But see infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
18. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(3) (1997). The property appraiser is not responsible for the
collection of ad valorem taxes. That function is performed by the county tax collector. See
id. § 192.001(4).
19. See FLA. STAT. §§ 193.085(1), .114(1) (1997); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
12D-1.002(1) (1997) (defining “assessment roll”).
20. “Taxable value” is defined as the assessed value less the amount of any exemptions applicable to the property. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(16) (1997).
21. See id. § 193.085(1). Interestingly, the property appraiser is only required to ensure that all real property is included on the tax rolls. See id. This duty does not extend to
tangible personal property because, unlike real property, the taxpayer has the obligation
of filing an annual return listing his or her tangible personal property. See id. §
193.052(1)(a). There are significant penalties for the failure to file a return or for the filing
of an erroneous return. See id. §§ 193.072-.073. As a general rule, the only required taxpayer filings related to real property are those that demonstrate entitlement to an exemption or classified use status. See, e.g., id. §§ 193.461(3)(a), 196.011(1)(a); see also FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-1.004, -7.001 (1997).
22. See FLA. STAT. § 193.114(1)(a)-(b) (1997); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D8.007(1)(a)-(b) (1997). A separate roll must also be maintained for “centrally assessed
property,” such as railroad property. See id. at r. 12D-8.007(1)(c); FLA. STAT. § 193.085(4)
(1997); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 12D-2 (1997). DOR is charged with valuing railroad
property and notifying each county of the taxable value of such property located within
the county. See FLA. STAT. § 193.085(4) (1997).
23. See FLA. STAT. § 193.114(2)-(3) (1997); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 12D-8 (1997).
DOR has general supervision over the assessment and valuation of all property subject to
ad valorem taxation. See FLA. STAT. § 195.002(1) (1997).
24. See FLA. STAT. § 193.1142(1) (1997). The purpose of DOR’s review is to determine
whether the rolls “meet all the appropriate requirements of law as to form and just value.”
Id. DOR may disapprove an assessment roll in whole or in part. See id. § 193.1142(2)(a).
The assessment roll will be deemed approved if DOR does not disapprove the roll within
50 days after its receipt. See id. § 193.1142(3). If DOR issues notice of its disapproval of
the rolls, or a part thereof, the TRIM Notice, see infra note 29, cannot be issued unless the
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The assessment rolls are used by each taxing authority within the
property appraiser’s jurisdiction in its budgeting process. 25 The
budget adopted by each taxing authority includes the amount of
revenue to be raised through ad valorem taxes and the millage rate 26
necessary to achieve that revenue level.27 Each taxing authority forwards its proposed millage rate to the property appraiser. 28 The
property appraiser uses that information to prepare the notice of
proposed property taxes that is sent to each taxpayer. This notice,
commonly referred to as the TRIM Notice, 29 contains the market
value, assessed value, and taxable value of the property, and also
includes the estimated ad valorem taxes owed on the property. 30 The
mailing of the TRIM Notice triggers the taxpayer’s right to seek
administrative review of the property appraiser’s assessment.31
A. Process for Determining the “Just Value” of Property Subject to
Ad Valorem Taxation
In preparing the assessment rolls, the property appraiser is not
required to perform an individual appraisal of all of the property
within the county each year.32 Instead, the property appraiser may
rely on “mass appraisal” techniques.33
“Mass appraisal” has been described as the “systematic appraisal
of groups of properties as of a given date using standardized procedures and statistical testing.”34 Stated another way, “mass appraisal”
taxing authority utilizes the interim assessment procedure in section 193.1145, Florida
Statutes, pending a legal challenge to DOR’s disapproval. See FLA. STAT. §§ 193.1142(4)(b),
.1145(1) (1997). Only once since 1980 has DOR formally disapproved a county’s assessment rolls. See Fla. Ad Valorem Tax Task Force, tape recordings of proceedings (July 25,
1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter July Tapes].
25. See generally FLA. STAT. § 200.065 (1997).
26. The millage rate is the measure of the tax rate for ad valorem tax purposes. Each
mil represents a tax rate of .1%, or one one-thousandth of a dollar. See id. § 192.001(10).
Stated another way, an ad valorem tax of one mil would generate $1 on each $1000 of taxable value.
27. See id. § 200.065(2)(a)1.
28. See id. § 200.065(2)(b).
29. TRIM is an acronym for “Truth in Millage.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D17.002(2)(q) (1997). DOR prescribes the form of the TRIM Notice. See id. ch. 12D-17; see
also FLA. STAT. § 200.069 (1997). The TRIM Notice informs the property owner of the potential increase in his ad valorem taxes that would result from the local government’s
proposed budget. See id. § 200.069(1), (2), (9); see also id. § 200.065(1) (describing the operation of the “rolled-back rate”).
30. See FLA. STAT. § 200.069 (1997). For a discussion of the background and operation of the TRIM process, see Pajcic et al., supra note 7, at 609-18.
31. See FLA. STAT. §§ 194.011, .036(1)(a) (1997).
32. See id. § 193.023(2) (requiring the property appraiser to physically inspect property every three years, or upon the request of the property owner).
33. See id. § 193.023(3).
34. INTERNATIONAL ASS’N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, PROPERTY APPRAISAL AND
ASSESSMENT ADMINISTRATION 303 (1990) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.)
(excerpt presented to Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force on July 24, 1996).
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is a procedure by which appraisal-related data gathered from the
entire market is utilized to determine the assessment of a particular
parcel.35 An important component of the “mass appraisal” process is
periodic reinspection, or reappraisal, of each property within the
taxing jurisdiction.36 Reappraisal is necessary to ensure the reliability of the information in the “mass appraisal” data base. 37 In this regard, section 193.023(2), Florida Statutes, requires the property appraiser to physically inspect each property every three years “to ensure that the tax roll meets all the requirements of law.”38
1. Section 193.011, Florida Statutes
As a general rule, all property subject to ad valorem taxation
must be assessed at “just value,” or fair market value, whether that
assessment is derived from a “mass appraisal” or an individual appraisal.39 In arriving at this “just value,” the property appraiser is
required to consider the following factors, which are commonly referred to as the “eight criteria”:
1. The present cash value of the property . . .;
2. The highest and best use to which the property can be expected
to be put in the immediate future and the present use of the property . . .;
3. The location of said property;
4. The quantity or size of said property;
5. The cost of said property and the present replacement value of
any improvements thereon;
6. The condition of said property;
7. The income from said property; and
8. The net proceeds of the sale of the property . . . .40

It is important to note that the property appraiser is not required
to utilize each of these factors in reaching the appraisal. Instead, the
35. See id. at 305-08. A “mass appraisal” system utilizes models and complex formulas to simulate supply and demand forces (and thus market value) within a particular jurisdiction. See id. at 310. These models can then be applied to individual parcels based
upon the characteristics of the parcel. See id. at 310-11.
36. See id. at 309-10. This reappraisal should occur at least once every six years. See
id. at 309.
37. See id. at 309-10.
38. FLA. STAT. § 193.023(2) (1997).
39. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. The phrase “just value” is a short-hand reference to
the constitutional mandate that ad valorem taxes are to be based upon “a just valuation of
all property” subject to ad valorem taxation. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 12D-1.002(2)
(1997) (equating “just value” with “just valuation” and “market value”); Walter v. Schuler,
176 So. 2d 81, 85-86 (Fla. 1965) (finding “just valuation” legally synonymous with “fair
market value,” meaning that which a “purchaser willing but not obliged to buy[] would
pay to one willing but not obliged to sell”) (quoting Root v. Wood, 155 Fla. 613, 622, 21 So.
2d 133, 137-38 (Fla. 1945) (citations omitted)). This article uses the phrases “just value,”
“just valuation,” and “market value” interchangeably.
40. FLA. STAT. 193.011 (1997).
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property appraiser must only consider each factor and give it the
weight that the facts justify.41
Section 193.011, Florida Statutes, reflects each of the recognized
methods of appraisal—cost, income, and market. Under the “cost approach,” the value of the property is measured by the cost of the materials and labor necessary to construct the property, adjusted for
depreciation based upon the age of the property. 42 Under the “income
approach,” the value of the property is measured by its incomeproducing capacity.43 Under the “market approach,” the value of the
property is derived from a comparative analysis of transactions
within the same market involving properties of similar size and
condition to the subject property.44
For any given property, the assessed value will likely vary depending on the approach utilized.45 In this regard, the property appraiser must rely on his experience and expertise in determining
which approach more accurately reflects a “just valuation” of a particular parcel.46 To assist in these determinations, DOR has adopted
guidelines and standards for valuing certain property.47
2. Classified Use Property and Exemptions
An exception to the general rule that all property must be assessed at fair market value is “classified use property,” which is re-

41. See, e.g., Lanier v. Walt Disney World Co., 316 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
42. See 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 97.07(f)(1) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994)
(“The cost approach assumes that no one would pay more for a building than what it
would cost to build a new one.”).
43. See id. The “income approach” is most commonly used in the valuation of commercial or industrial real property. Such property is typically valued on an income-persquare-foot basis. See, e.g., Mastroianni v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 664 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla.
1st DCA 1995) (determining valuation of a high-rise office building).
44. See 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 42, § 97.07(f)(1) (“In the direct
sales or market comparison approach, the appraiser assumes no one would pay more for a
property than they would for an equally desirable one.”). The “market approach” is commonly used for valuing residential real property because of the significant availability of
comparative sales data. See id.
45. See, e.g., Walker v. Smathers, 507 So. 2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
(describing the permissible variation as a “reasonable range of values”).
46. See, e.g., Daniel v. Canterbury Towers, Inc., 462 So. 2d 497, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA
1984) (“It is because there are so many well recognized approaches and techniques for arriving at an appraisal decision that the property appraiser’s decision may be overturned
only if there is no reasonable hypothesis to support it.”).
47. See FLORIDA DEPT. OF REV., CLASSIFIED USE REAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES,
STANDARD ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES AND MEASURES OF VALUE, AGRICULTURAL
GUIDELINES (1982) (incorporated by reference in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-51.001
(1997)) (on file with Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter AGRICULTURAL GUIDELINES];
see also 23 Fla. Admin. W. 3497, 3498 (July 18, 1997) (proposing to adopt Standard Measures of Value: Tangible Personal Property Appraisal Guidelines in FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
r. 12D-51.002) (copy of proposed guideline available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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quired to be assessed based upon the character of its use. 48 The most
common type of “classified use property” is that used for agricultural
purposes.49 Additionally, some types of property are exempt from ad
valorem taxation in whole or in part.50 The most prevalent type of
exempt property is homestead property.51 The appraisal and assessment of homestead property is further restricted by article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. That provision was adopted in
1992 as a citizen’s initiative, and is known as the “Save Our Homes
Amendment.”52 In essence, the “Save Our Homes Amendment” caps
the annual increase in the assessed value of homestead property at
three percent.53 It has been estimated that this cap on assessments
resulted in a loss of over $165 million in potential ad valorem tax
revenue for fiscal year 1996-97.54
B. Administrative and Judicial Review of the Property Appraiser’s
Assessment
If a taxpayer objects to the valuation of his property contained in
the TRIM Notice, he may request an “informal conference” with the
property appraiser.55 Upon receipt of such a request, the property
appraiser, or a member of his staff, is required to confer with the

48. See FLA. CONST. art VII, § 4(a)-(b); FLA. STAT. § 193.441 (1997); see also id. §
193.461(5) (listing various types of agricultural uses); AGRICULTURAL GUIDELINES, supra
note 47.
49. In 1995, there were over 221,000 agricultural parcels in Florida. See FLA. DOR,
AD VALOREM TAX TASK FORCE: AUGUST 27, 1996, MEETING DATA PRESENTATION 5 (1996)
(on file at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented to Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force
on August 27, 1996) [hereinafter DOR DATA PRESENTATION]. The differential between the
market value and taxable value of these parcels was over $27 billion, which resulted in a
loss of potential ad valorem tax revenue of $595 million. See 1996 FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 129 (fiscal year 1995-96 data).
50. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-7.006 to -7.014 (homestead property), 7.015 (property used for educational purposes), -7.016 (government-owned property)
(1997); see generally FLA. STAT. ch. 196 (1997).
51. See DOR DATA PRESENTATION, supra note 49, at 5. For tax year 1995, homestead
parcels accounted for approximately 43% of all of the parcels subject to ad valorem taxation. See id. (accounting for over 3.3 million parcels). Only the first $25,000 of the assessed
value of homestead property is exempt from ad valorem taxation. See FLA. CONST. art.
VII, § 6(d); FLA. STAT. § 196.031(3)(d)-(e) (1997). Other types of property, such as that
owned by governmental entities or religious institutions, are immune or fully exempt from
ad valorem taxation. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a); FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012(1), .192, .196,
.199 (1997).
52. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(c); see also PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, note 3,
at 31.
53. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(c)(1)(A). The increase in the assessment may not exceed 3% of the assessment for the prior year or the percent change in the Consumer Price
Index, whichever is lower. See id. § 4(c)(1); see also FLA. STAT. § 193.155 (1997)
(implementing legislation).
54. See 1996 FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK , supra note 4, at 129.
55. See FLA. STAT. § 194.011(2) (1997).
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taxpayer regarding the correctness of the assessment. 56 At this
meeting, the taxpayer must be given an opportunity to present any
facts that may support a change in the assessment by the property
appraiser.57 If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the resolution of his
complaint by the property appraiser, the taxpayer may petition the
county’s Value Adjustment Board (VAB)58 for review of the assessment.59
The petition for review must be filed60 with the VAB within
twenty-five days after the mailing of the TRIM Notice if the petition
relates to valuation issues, or within thirty days after the mailing of
the TRIM Notice if the petition involves the denial of an exemption,
an agricultural classification, or a deferral. 61 The petition must be
accompanied by the filing fee prescribed by the VAB.62
The VAB is required to meet within forty-five days after the
mailing of the TRIM Notice to consider any timely-filed petitions for
review.63 Alternatively, the VAB may appoint one or more special
masters to hear the petitions and to make recommendations to the
VAB.64 The hearings on the petitions, whether conducted by the VAB

56. See id.
57. See id.
58. The VAB is composed of five members: three members of the board of county
commissioners and two members of the local school board. See id. § 194.015.
59. Neither the “informal conference” nor the VAB process is a prerequisite to filing
an action challenging the assessment in circuit court. See id. §§ 194.011(2), .034(1)(b). If
the taxpayer does not seek review of the assessment by the VAB, the challenge must be
filed in circuit court within 60 days after the assessment is certified for collection.See id. §
194.171(2).
60. Filing occurs upon receipt of the petition by the VAB. See 81-43 Fla. Op. Att’y
Gen. 130, 131 (1981); cf. FLA. STAT. § 192.047(1) (1997) (stating that the application for
exemption is deemed filed on the date of mailing).
61. See FLA. STAT. § 194.011(3)(d) (1997). The VAB, for good cause shown, may consider late-filed petitions if consideration would not “be prejudicial to [the VAB’s] functions
in the taxing process.” FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003(8) (1997). It was suggested
to the Task force that the 25-day filing period be expanded so that the property appraiser
would be given more time to resolve the taxpayer’s concerns outside of the “formal” VAB
process. See Fla. Ad Valorem Tax Task Force, tape recordings of proceedings (Aug. 27,
1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (comments of Ron Schultz, Citrus County
Property Appraiser) [hereinafter August Tapes].
62. See FLA. STAT. § 194.013(3) (1997). The filing fee may not exceed $15. See id. §
194.013(1). The fee is refundable to the taxpayer if he prevails before the VAB. See id. §
194.013(4). A bill introduced in the 1997 Regular Session would have increased the maximum allowable filing fee to $30. See Fla. SB 1556 (1997) (sponsored by Senator William
Turner, Dem., Miami Shores). The bill was never heard by a committee and was ultimately withdrawn from consideration. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 126, SB 1556.
63. See FLA. STAT. § 194.032(1)(a) (1997).
64. See id. § 194.035(1); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.002 (1997). Each special
master must be either an attorney knowledgeable in the area of ad valorem taxation or a
professional real estate appraiser with no less than five years of experience. See FLA.
STAT. § 194.035(1) (1997); see also 81-37 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 5 (1981) (discussing the necessary qualifications for real estate appraisers).
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or a special master, are quasi-judicial in nature and must be conducted in accordance with the rules adopted by DOR.65
The taxpayer has the right to be represented by an attorney and
to present testimony or other evidence at the hearing. 66 Upon the request of either the taxpayer or the property appraiser, witnesses can
be required to testify under oath.67 Each party has the right to crossexamine witnesses.68 The VAB’s written decision must be issued
within twenty days of adjournment of the board and must contain
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the reasons for upholding or
overturning the property appraiser’s assessment.69
The VAB’s decision can be “appealed” to the circuit court in the
county where the property is located.70 The taxpayer has an unconditional right to “appeal” the VAB’s decision. 71 The property appraiser may only “appeal” if the VAB’s decision violates the constitution, a statute, or administrative rule, or if the VAB reduces the
property appraiser’s assessment by certain percentages. 72 The circuit
court proceeding is de novo and the burden of proof is on the party
initiating the action.73

65. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003 (1997); see also FLA. STAT. § 194.034
(1997).
66. See FLA. STAT. § 194.034(1)(a) (1997).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. § 194.034(2); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003(5) (1997).
70. See FLA. STAT. § 194.171(1) (1997). Venue for suits involving railroad property
assessments is in Leon County. See id. § 193.085(4)(e). The complaint must be filed in circuit court within 60 days after the final certification of the assessment rolls. See id. §
194.171(2).
71. See id. § 194.036(2).
72. See id. § 194.036(1)(b). The property appraiser may only “appeal” if the variance
from his assessment falls within the following range:
Assessment:
Variance:
less than $50,000
15%
$50,001 - 500,000
10%
$500,001 - 1 million
7.5%
greater than $1 million
5%
See id. The property appraiser may also file suit against the VAB if he alleges (and DOR
concurs) that the VAB’s decisions consistently and continuously violate the intent of the
law or administrative rules. See id. § 194.036(2)(c).
73. See id. § 194.036(3). The party initiating the “appeal” is designated “plaintiff,”
and the other party, the party that prevailed before the VAB, is designated “defendant.”
See id. § 194.181(1)-(2). Where the property appraiser initiates the proceeding, his burden
is to demonstrate the correctness of his assessment. See Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 416 So. 2d 1133, 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (Pearson, J., concurring
in part). This burden can be satisfied by demonstrating the assessment was made “in substantial compliance with Section 193.011.” Id. If the taxpayer initiates the action, his burden is to disprove “every reasonable hypothesis of a lawful assessment.” See discussion infra Part II.C.
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The intricacies of this de novo appeal were discussed in Bystrom
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States .74 In that
case, the court held that the VAB’s decision is not entitled to any
presumption of correctness.75 However, where the taxpayer appeals
the decision—thereby seeking a further reduction in the valuation of
the property—the VAB’s valuation establishes “the benchmark
above which the Circuit Court cannot go.” 76 Stated another way, the
proceeding in circuit court will not jeopardize the reduction in value
that the taxpayer obtained at the VAB unless the property appraiser
has also “appealed” the VAB’s determination. 77 To obtain a further
reduction in the assessment, however, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the property appraiser’s valuation78 was unsupported by
“excluding every reasonable hypothesis of a legal assessment.”79
If the taxpayer “appeals” the VAB decision, or if the taxpayer
challenges the assessment in circuit court without first going
through the VAB process, the taxpayer is required to pay the portion
of the tax that the taxpayer admits in good faith is owed. 80 Moreover,
the taxpayer may not maintain an action in circuit court unless the
taxes on the property for subsequent years continue to be paid. 81
These requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and the failure to
comply with these requirements will result in dismissal of the challenge.82

74. 416 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see also FLORIDA STATE AND LOCAL TAXES,
supra note 15, § 8.03 at 356-62.
75. See Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1146 (Pearson, J., concurring). Judge Pearson’s concurring opinion, joined by Judge Hubbart, is actually the majority opinion with respect to
the portion of the decision relating to the taxpayer’s burden of proof in an “appeal” of the
VAB’s decision. See id. at 1145.
76. Id. at 1147. This principle does not apply, however, where both the taxpayer and
the property appraiser appeal the VAB’s decision. See id.
77. See id.
78. Judge Nesbitt suggested that the proceeding in circuit court was to review the
VAB’s valuation. See id. at 1143. The remainder of the panel disagreed and noted that
Judge Nesbitt’s view “would change the nature of the Circuit Court proceedings from de
novo to classic certiorari.” Id. at 1146 n.15 (Pearson, J., concurring).
79. Id. If, however, the county property appraiser’s assessment was not entitled to a
presumption of correctness because the property appraiser failed to consider each criterion in section 193.011, Florida Statutes, the taxpayer would only be required to overcome
the VAB’s determination by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1145. This was the
case in Bystrom. See id.
80. See FLA. STAT. § 194.171(3) (1997). Payment of the tax owed prior to bringing an
action in circuit court is not an admission that the tax was due and does not prejudice the
taxpayer’s right to challenge the tax or to seek a refund. See id. § 194.171(4). This provision, along with the interest and penalties that are assessed against the taxpayer if the
challenge is unsuccessful, encourages full payment of the assessed tax. See id. §
194.192(2).
81. See id. § 194.171(5).
82. See id. § 191.171(6).

196

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:185

C. The “Problem”: Judicially Created Burdens of Proof in Ad
Valorem Tax Challenge Cases
As noted above, critics have argued that the VAB process and the
circuit court review of assessments provide no meaningful relief because of the difficult standard that taxpayers must meet in order to
prevail. This standard was not adopted by the Legislature nor is it
codified by statute;83 instead, the standard was created by the Florida Supreme Court in 1929.84
1. Florida Case Law
The first case that defined the taxpayer’s burden of proof to overcome the property appraiser’s presumption of correctness appears to
be Folsom v. Bank of Greenwood .85 In that case, the taxpayer challenged the property appraiser’s assessment of its bank stock, surplus, and undivided profits.86 The trial court invalidated the assessment because the property appraiser failed to also assess similar
property of other businesses.87 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed.88

83. Interestingly, this standard is “codified” in DOR’s rules governing the VAB. See
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003(3) (1997) (citing Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Center, Inc., 229 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1969)); see also infra notes 311-15 and accompanying text
(discussing proposed amendments to FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003(3)).
84. See Folsom v. Bank of Greenwood, 97 Fla. 426, 429-30, 120 So. 317, 318 (1929). At
the outset, it is important to recognize that courts are generally reluctant to involve
themselves in ad valorem tax matters. As one commentator noted:
This reluctance stems from two policy considerations. First, revenues required
to fund essential governmental services require stability. Courts have always
lived in fear that their intervention in the process would upset the stability of
this essential revenue raising mechanism and cause turmoil in the provision of
essential governmental services. Thus the courts have always felt that, barring
peculiar circumstances, they should not be called upon to mediate between
taxpayers and tax users. Secondly, the courts recognize the technical nature of
the determination of the tax and all of its components (value, assessment,
equalization factors, levy rates, etc.). They are also mindful of the elaborate
administrative systems established by most legislatures to give taxpayers notice of these components and an opportunity to be heard by technically proficient administrative bodies before these components are finalized. Courts have
felt that technically competent tax administrators are always better equipped
to mediate disputes than are courts which probably are not technically proficient in the area and do not possess the resources to become proficient.
GREGORY J. LAFAKIS, BURDENS OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS, 4-5 (1995) (available at Fla.
DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (provided to the Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force at its meeting on November 13, 1996).
85. 97 Fla. 426, 120 So. 317 (1929).
86. See id. at 429, 120 So. at 318. These items are intangible personal property and
are no longer subject to ad valorem taxation on the local level. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§
1(a), 2. Currently, DOR administers the tax on intangible personal property. See FLA.
STAT. ch. 199 (1997).
87. See Folsom, 97 Fla. at 429, 120 So. at 318.
88. See id. at 432, 120 So. at 319.
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The court held that a taxpayer challenging the validity of the
property appraiser’s assessment must overcome the “prima facie correctness”89 of the assessment “by appropriate and sufficient allegations and proofs excluding every reasonable hypothesis of a legal a ssessment.”90 Since Folsom, Florida courts have applied the “every
reasonable hypothesis” standard91 in cases where an assessment is
challenged, whether based upon the property appraiser’s determination of value or denial of classified status.92
The First District Court of Appeal applied this standard in Mastroianni v. Barnett Banks, Inc. 93 At issue in Mastroianni was the
1992 and 1993 valuations of the Barnett Center, a high-rise office
89. Id. at 429-30, 120 So. at 318. The court previously referred to this presumption of
correctness in City of Tampa v. Palmer, 89 Fla. 514, 105 So. 115 (1925), stating that “[t]he
good faith of tax officers and the validity of their official actions are presumed, and when
assailed the burden of proof is upon the complaining party.” Id. at 520, 105 So. at 117
(emphasis added) (citing Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 353, 81 So. 503, 507
(1919)).
90. Folsom, 97 Fla. 430, 120 So. at 318 (emphasis added). In support of this standard,
the court cited a number of United States and Florida Supreme Court decisions, including
German-American Lumber Co. v. Barbee, 59 Fla. 493, 52 So. 292 (1910). In that case, the
court described the appropriate standard in cases where a taxpayer is challenging the validity of an assessment as follows:
The law contemplates that a wide discretion be accorded to the tax assessor
in the valuation of property for the purposes of taxation. In the absence of a
clear and positive showing of fraud or of an illegal act or of an abuse of discretion rendering an assessment authorized by law so arbitrary and discriminating as to amount to a fraud upon a taxpayer or to a denial of the equal protection of the laws, the courts will not in general control the discretion of the tax
assessor in making valuations for taxing purposes.
Id. at 498-99, 52 So. at 294.
91. Some courts have couched the standard in slightly different terms. See, e.g.,
Blake v. Xerox Corp., 447 So. 2d 1348, 1350 (Fla. 1984) (stating that the issue is “whether
the appraiser . . . could conceivably and reasonably have arrived at the appraisal value
being challenged”); Walker v. Trump, 549 So. 2d 1098, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (holding
that a taxpayer must demonstrate that there is “no reasonable basis whatsoever” for the
challenged assessment).
92. See, e.g., Blake, 447 So. 2d at 1351 (valuation of tangible personal property);
Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1969) (valuation of timberland property); Davis
v. St. Joe Paper Co., 652 So. 2d 907, 908-09 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 661 So. 2d 825
(Fla. 1995) (denying classified status); St. Petersburg Kennel Club, Inc. v. Smith, 662 So.
2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (denying classified status). It does not appear that the
“every reasonable hypothesis” standard, as such, has been applied in cases where the taxpayer challenges the denial of an exemption. In this regard, courts appear more willing to
second-guess the property appraiser’s determination with respect to exemptions. See, e.g.,
Robbins v. Florida Conference Assoc. of Seventh Day Adventists, 641 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla.
3d DCA 1994) (reversing the property appraiser’s determination that a vacant lot owned
by a church was not entitled to religious exemption). However, the taxpayer has the burden to prove his entitlement to the exemption. See, e.g., Jar Corp. v. Culbertson, 246 So.
2d 144, 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
93. 664 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Arguably, this decision triggered the subsequent legislative actions that resulted in the repeal of the “any reasonable hypothesis”
standard. Senator Horne, one of the primary sponsors of the 1997 legislation that accomplished this goal, is from the Jacksonville area, and the unsuccessful taxpayer/plaintiff in Mastroianni was Barnett Bank, a Jacksonville-based corporation.
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building in downtown Jacksonville.94 The county property appraiser
assessed the property at approximately $70 million for 1992 and approximately $65 million for 1993.95 Barnett’s appraiser assessed the
property at $55 million for 1992 and $60 million for 1993. 96 The trial
court determined that the county property appraiser failed to
“legally consider” each criterion in section 193.011, Florida Statutes,
and therefore his assessments did not enjoy a presumption of correctness.97 The trial court then determined that Barnett’s assessments were a more reasonable reflection of the property’s “just
value” and substituted Barnett’s assessments in lieu of the county
property appraiser’s assessments.98
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed and directed the trial court to “reinstate the original assessments made by
the county property appraiser.”99 The First District Court held that
the trial court erred because the record demonstrated that the
county property appraiser did, in fact, consider all of the criteria in
section 193.011, Florida Statutes, and that the appraiser “followed
the policy and directives from the Department of Revenue in making
the appraisal.”100 Because the record demonstrated that the county
property appraiser’s assessments were supported by a reasonable
hypothesis of legality, the court reasoned that they should not have
been rejected.
One component of Barnett’s challenge was that the property appraiser did not correctly apply the income method upon which his assessment was purportedly based.101 Specifically, Barnett argued that
the property appraiser improperly applied a rate of occupancy for the
Barnett Center of eighty percent even though the actual rate of occupancy of the building was only sixty-one percent. 102 The First District specifically rejected this argument and stated that “[a]s long as
available actual figures are considered, the decision whether it is

94. See id. at 285.
95. See id. The VAB affirmed the county property appraiser’s assessment for 1992,
but reduced the assessment for 1993 to $60 million. See id. Barnett appealed the former
decision and the property appraiser appealed the latter. See id. The cases were consolidated for trial and the appeal. See id.
96. See id. at 286.
97. See id. at 287.
98. See id. at 287-88.
99. Id. at 288.
100. Id. The county property appraiser considered, but rejected, the market value and
cost approach to valuation of the property. See id. at 285. Instead, the appraiser relied
upon the income approach. See id. at 286.
101. See id. at 286-87.
102. See id. at 286. The 80% rate reflected the average occupancy rate for downtown
Jacksonville office buildings. See id. at 288.
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reasonable to use them falls within the administrative discretion of
the property appraiser.”103
This holding is consistent with Blake v. Xerox Corporation ,104
where the Florida Supreme Court chided the lower courts for determining which appraisal method was “better.”105 The court stated
that “the only questions presented by the instant case are whether
the appraiser considered all factors mandated by the law and
whether his methods and conclusion are supported by any reasonable hypothesis of a legal assessment.”106 Stated another way, because the property appraiser relied upon one of the available methods for valuing the property, his assessment would be upheld, even if
another method more accurately reflected “just value.”
The Blake and Mastroianni decisions epitomize the length to
which courts are willing to go to uphold the property appraiser’s determinations. In this regard, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the property appraiser regarding which appraisal
method to use or whether the methodology used was properly applied based upon the facts available to the property appraiser. From
the taxpayer’s standpoint, these decisions illustrated the need for
change to the ad valorem tax challenge process.
2. Other States
The “every reasonable hypothesis” burden of proof is unique to
Florida.107 While most other states afford the local property appraiser’s assessment a presumption of correctness, 108 the taxpayer’s
burden in overcoming the presumption is generally less onerous. In
fact, one recent study identified eighteen states in which the taxpayer’s burden of proof is “preponderance of the evidence” or lower.109

103. Id. at 288 (citations omitted and emphasis added); accord Florida East Coast Ry.
Co. v. Department of Rev., 620 So. 2d 1051, 1060-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (upholding the
property appraiser’s valuation which considered, but did not use, actual income figures).
But see Bystrom v. Hotelerama Assoc. Ltd., 431 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
(finding that it was error not to consider actual income figures).
104. 447 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1984).
105. Id. at 1350-51. The property appraiser relied upon the list-price-less-depreciation
method for valuing Xerox’s property in Dade County. See id. at 1350. Xerox argued that
the property should be valued based upon the income capitalization method. See id. The
trial court determined that the method used by the appraiser was “better,” but the district
court reached the opposite conclusion. See id.
106. Id. at 1351.
107. See Adolph Koeppel & Saul R. Fenchel, Challenging Ad Valorem Real Property
Assessments in Florida, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1983, at 540, 542 n.14.
108. See COMPARISON OF TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 9, at 4 n.2.
109. See id. at 5-6, Table 2.
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D. The 1996 Legislature’s “Fix”: House Bill 557
Representative Starks and Senator Horne introduced bills in the
1996 Regular Session that would have legislatively overruled Mastroianni. Those bills, House Bill 557 and Senate Bill 740, received
significant bi-partisan support110 and were placed on committee
agendas early in the session.111 The bills proposed to add a new subsection (7) to section 194.171, Florida Statutes, to provide:
In any administrative or judicial action in which a taxpayer
challenges an ad valorem tax assessment, the denial of an exemption, or the denial of classified status, the property appraiser’s assessment or determination shall be presumed correct if the property appraiser has complied with the requirements of law and followed recognized professional standards of appraisal practice. The
taxpayer shall have the burden of overcoming the presumption by a
preponderance of the evidence, but shall not have the burden of pr esenting proof which excludes every reasonable hypothesis of a legal
assessment.112

This proposed reduction in the taxpayer’s burden of proof generated significant controversy. The primary opponents of House Bill
557 and Senate Bill 740 were the county property appraisers and local governments.
The opponents of the bills argued that the reduction in the burden of proof would have a significant negative fiscal impact on local
governments113 and, therefore, would constitute an unfunded mandate.114 The opponents further argued that any change to the exist110. Ninety-three members were listed as co-sponsors of House Bill 557, and 32 members co-sponsored Senate Bill 740. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION,
1996 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 266, HB 557; id. HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 83, SB 740.
111. House Bill 557 was heard by the House Judiciary Committee during the second
week of the session. See id., HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 266, HB 557. Senate Bill 740 was
heard by the Senate Judiciary Committee during the first week of the session. See id.,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 83, SB 740.
112. Fla. HB 557 (1996); Fla. SB 740 (1996) (emphasis added).
113. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, HB 557 (1996) Staff Analysis 1, 4-5 (final June
3, 1996) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter HB 557 Staff Analysis]. This argument is apparently based upon the assumption that more taxpayers would prevail in challenges to the
property appraiser’s assessment of their property under this lower standard. To prevail,
however, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the assessment is in excess of “just value.”
See id. at 5. Therefore, a necessary assumption of the opponents’ argument regarding the
fiscal impact of the bill is that the property of many taxpayers is currently assessed in excess of “just value.” See id. In this regard, the comments of Justice Terrell in City of
Tampa v. Palmer, 89 Fla. 514, 105 So. 115 (1925), seem particularly applicable: “I am
convinced that a very large proportion of our taxpayers are burdened with [excessive assessments], . . . but [they] must be shown to have been made under circumstances
amounting to fraud, before equity can relieve against them.” Id. at 536, 105 So. at 122
(Terrell, J., concurring).
114. The Speaker of the House determined that House Bill 557 implicated the mandate provisions of article VII, section 18 of the Florida Constitution. See HB 557 Staff
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ing burden of proof would be unconstitutional. This latter argument
was based upon two separate, but related, grounds. First, the opponents argued that the existing burden of proof is a logical and necessary component of the presumption of correctness to which property
appraisers, as constitutional officers , are entitled.115 Second, the opponents argued that the Legislature’s attempts to weaken this judicially created burden of proof would violate the separation of powers
provision of the Florida Constitution.116 Neither of these arguments
are overly persuasive.
The “constitutional officer” argument assumes that the “every
reasonable hypothesis” standard is, in fact, inextricably linked to the
presumption of correctness.117 While courts have discussed these issues together, a close reading of these cases suggests that the primary basis for the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard is the
complex nature of the appraisal process rather than the stature of
the individual conducting the appraisal. 118 Similarly, the “separation
of powers” argument is based upon the erroneous assumption that
only courts may establish burdens of proof. To the contrary, burdens
of proof are generally not procedural in nature and, therefore, the
Legislature is free to establish burdens of proof without infringing
upon the judiciary’s control of the court system.119

Analysis, supra note 113, at 5-6; see also Fla. S. Comm. on Ways and Means, CS for SB
740 (1996) Staff Analysis 4-5 (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with comm.). Specifically, the bill
would reduce the authority of local governments to raise revenues. See Fla. HB 557 Staff
Analysis, supra note 113, at 4-6. As a result, the bill must be passed by two-thirds of the
membership of both houses of the Legislature. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(b). As discussed below, the Legislature approved House Bill 557 by the necessary vote. See infra
notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
115. See HB 557 Staff Analysis, supra note 113, at 2, 6.
116. See id. at 6.
117. See id. at 2; see also THOMAS W. LOGUE, THE PROPERTY APPRAISER’S PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS: ANSWERS TO COMMON QUESTIONS 3-5 (available at Fla. DOR,
Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented to Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force on Oct. 24, 1996).
118. For example, in Daniel v. Canterbury Towers, Inc., 462 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA
1984), the court opined: “The reason for the ‘no reasonable hypothesis’ doctrine with respect to the judicial review of property appraiser decisions, is that there are numerous,
and sometimes conflicting, appraisal theories or techniques for establishing an opinion as
to real estate value.” Id. at 502. Accord Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d 305, 309 (Fla. 1969)
(“The appraisal of real estate is an art, not a science.”); Schleman v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 151 Fla. 96, 104-05, 9 So. 2d 197, 200 (1942). But see Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.
2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1977) (“Tax assessors are constitutional officers and as such their actions
are clothed with the presumption of correctness.”).
119. See generally 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 129 (1984) (“The Legislature may
also regulate the burden of proof, and the extent thereof required.”) (citations omitted); 10
FLA. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 183-84 (1979 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the boundaries of legislative infringement on judicial powers); see also CHARLES EHRHARDT, FLORIDA
EVIDENCE § 303.1 (1997) (distinguishing the procedural “bubble bursting” presumption
from those presumptions based upon public policy). The presumption of correctness afforded to the property appraiser’s assessment is based upon public policy considerations,
see infra notes 303-07 and accompanying text, and, therefore, is not a “bubble bursting”
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The opponents’ arguments were not addressed by the first committees that heard House Bill 557 and Senate Bill 740. However, the
bills were subsequently amended in an attempt to appease opponents and avoid a gubernatorial veto of the bill. In this regard, the
Senate Ways and Means Committee adopted a Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 740 that limited the applicability of the
“preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof contained in the bill
to the 1997, 1998, and 1999 tax rolls.120 After 1999, the existing
“every reasonable hypothesis” burden of proof would apply unless
the Legislature subsequently extended the applicability of the lower
burden of proof.121 The Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 740 also
required the Office of Programs, Policy, and Governmental Accountability (OPPAGA) to “study the current procedure for challenging ad
valorem assessments and determine whether changes are necessary.”122 A similar amendment to House Bill 557 was adopted in the
House Finance and Tax Committee.123
On the House Floor, House Bill 557 was conformed to the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 740 and then approved by a vote of
108 to 6.124 The Senate then approved House Bill 557 by a vote of 35
to 4 and sent the bill to the Governor.125 Notwithstanding the overpresumption. As such, the presumption, and the related burden of proof, are not exclusively procedural in nature. In this regard, Professor Ehrhardt noted:
The burden of persuasion that must be met to disprove the presumed fact is
defined by the applicable substantive law and is not the same for all section
90.304 presumptions. For example, a presumption may require a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence to disprove the presumed
fact. Another presumption may require proof of fraud to overcome the burden.
Usually, the stronger the social policy underlying the presumption, the greater
quantum of proof required to overcome the presumption.
EHRHARDT, supra, § 304.1 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
120. See Fla. CS for SB 740, § 1 (1996).
121. See id.
122. Id. § 3. The committee substitute also required OPPAGA to study the fiscal impacts of the reduction in the burden of proof and report its findings to the Legislature
prior to the 1999 Session. See id. § 2. It was expected that the OPPAGA report would be
used by the Legislature to determine whether to extend the applicability of the
“preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof beyond 1999.
123. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin. & Tax’n, Amendment 1 to Fla. HB 557 (1996) (on
file with comm.) (proposed FLA. STAT. 194.171) (Starks amendment). The amendment to
House Bill 557 did not include the OPPAGA study of the fiscal impacts of the lower burden of proof. See id. An amendment that would have created a study commission in lieu of
any reductions to the burden of proof was defeated in the House Finance and Tax Committee. See H.R. Comm. on Fin & Tax’n, Amendment 2 to HB 557 (1996) (on file with
comm.) (proposed FLA. STAT. 194.171) (Geller amendment). The study commission would
have served from July 1, 1996, through June 30, 1998, and was directed to “study the current procedure for challenging ad valorem assessments and determine whether changes
are necessary.” Id.
124. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1574-75 (Reg. Sess. 1996).
125. See FLA. S. JOUR. 838-39, 906 (Reg. Sess. 1996); see also FLA. LEGIS., FINAL
LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 266,
HB 557.
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whelming legislative approval of House Bill 557, opponents of the
bill continued to lobby against it and urged the Governor to veto the
bill.126
E. The Governor’s “Response”: Veto of House Bill 557
Governor Chiles vetoed House Bill 557.127 In his veto message, the
Governor acknowledged that the fairness of the system for challenging ad valorem tax assessments is “a legitimate concern.” 128 However, the Governor suggested that the reduction of the burden of
proof in House Bill 557 “may create as many inequities as it attempts to correct and will seriously affect local government revenues.”129
The Governor did support the studies provided for in House Bill 557,
at least in concept. In this regard, the Governor stated:
The studies proposed by HB 557 are a good idea, but it is more rational, in my view, to identify the potential impact of this issue b efore it is implemented. By instituting a study first, the state can
then move forward with recommended changes, without unnecessarily risking substantial damage to local government and school
district finances.130

These comments foreshadowed the Governor’s issuance of Executive Order 96-172. The Executive Order was issued the same day
that the Governor vetoed House Bill 557 and created the Florida Ad
Valorem Task Force.131 The Governor charged the Task Force with
studying the following issues:

126. See Exec. Office of the Gov., Office of Legis. Aff., Legislative Bill Analysis, HB
557, 2-3 (May 22, 1996) (on file with Exec. Office of the Gov., Office of Legis. Aff.) (listing
opponents of House Bill 557); see also Letter from Bruce Host, Chairman, Leon County
Board of County Commissioners to The Honorable Lawton Chiles, Governor of Florida
(May 15, 1996) (available at Exec. Office of the Governor, Office of Legis. Aff.) (“We urge
you to reject HB 557 . . . .”); Letter from Jim Naugle, Mayor, City of Ft. Lauderdale, to
The Honorable Lawton Chiles, Governor of Florida (May 20, 1996) (available at Exec. Office of the Gov., Office of Legis. Aff.) (“We respectfully request that you VETO [House Bill
557].”).
127. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 266, HB 557.
128. Veto of Fla. HB 557 (1996) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec’y of State Sandra B.
Mortham, May 31, 1996) (on file with Sec. of State, The Capital, Tallahassee, Fla.)
[hereinafter Veto Message].
129. Id. at 1. The Governor noted that estimates of the fiscal impacts to local governments of House Bill 557 ranged from $70 million to over $480 million. See id. at 2; see also
HB 557 Staff Analysis, supra note 113, at 1, 4-5 (estimating an annual negative fiscal impact to local governments of $69.5 to $160.3 million).
130. Veto Message, supra note 128, at 2 (emphasis added).
131. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 96-172 (May 31, 1996).

204

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:185

a. An evaluation of the statutory procedures for valuing property
as utilized by county property appraisers for purposes of Florida’s
ad valorem tax.
b. An evaluation of the role of the Florida Department of Revenue
as it relates to the approval of the county ad valorem tax rolls in
the State of Florida.
c. An evaluation of the process for correcting error as that process
relates to the determination of values, the granting of exemptions,
and the classifications of lands by county property appraisers.
d. An evaluation of the Value Adjustment Board (VAB) proceedings and appeals to the courts as prescribed in Chapter 194, Florida Statutes, to specifically include the burden of proof currently
required in such appeals.
e. An evaluation of the feasibility of imposing ad valorem taxes on
a partial year basis.
f. An evaluation of any fiscal ramifications to the State or local
governments that may result from any proposed changes recommended by the Florida Ad Valorem Task Force.132

The Task Force’s findings and recommendations were to be submitted to the Governor and the Legislature no later than February 15,
1997.133
The study contemplated by the Executive Order was significantly
broader than those provided for in House Bill 557. Whereas the
studies in House Bill 557 focused primarily on the procedures for
challenging ad valorem tax assessments, the Executive Order required a review of the entire ad valorem tax process, including the
underlying valuation process and DOR’s review and approval of the
ad valorem tax rolls.134 The burden of proof issue was to be considered by the Task Force, but it was not intended to be the focus of the
Task Force’s study.135
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NEW BURDENS OF PROOF
A. The “Forum for Resolution”: The Florida Ad Valorem Task Force
Governor Chiles’ appointments to the Task Force represented a
broad range of interests and experience. The Task Force’s seventeen
members included county property appraisers, local government officials, the Executive Director of DOR, the Governor’s Chief of Staff,
as well as individuals representing business interests. 136 Senator
132. Id. § 2.
133. See id.
134. Compare id. § 2(a)-(f), with Fla. HB 557, §§ 2-3 (1996) (enrolled version).
135. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 96-172, § 2(d) (May 31, 1996). However, as discussed in
Part III.A.1., the burden of proof issue became the focus of the Task Force.
136. See Press Release from the Executive Office of the Gov., Gov. Lawton Chiles
(June 21, 1996) (announcing appointments to the Florida Ad Valorem Task Force) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Press Release].
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Horne, Representative Starks, and two other legislators—
Representative Lori Edwards137 and Senator William Turner138—
were also appointed to the Task Force.139 Steve Pajcic, an attorney
from Jacksonville and a former Democratic candidate for Governor,
was appointed chairman of the Task Force.140
1. The “Deliberation”: The Task Force’s Meetings
The organizational meeting of the Task Force was held in Tallahassee on July 25, 1996.141 At that meeting, the Task Force reviewed
its charge from the Governor and attempted to formulate a strategy
for addressing each of the issues set forth in the Executive Order. It
was clear, however, that the primary focus of Senator Horne and
many of the other Task Force members was on the “burden of proof”
issue.142 In this regard, the Task Force members requested the DOR
staff to compile data regarding the taxpayer’s success rate under the
current tax appeal process and several representative cases in which
the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard played a role in the outcome.143 These requests set the stage for the next several Task Force
meetings.
(a) August 1996: Tallahassee
The Task Force received historical and background information
on the ad valorem tax process during its August meeting. 144 The staff
of the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) presented a report to the Task Force regarding millage rates, 145 and
DOR staff presented the Task Force with ad valorem tax data collected by DOR for the 1994 and 1995 tax years. 146 The purpose of
these presentations was to provide the Task Force with an understanding of the relative importance of ad valorem tax revenue to local governments, and to provide a statistical gauge of the existing ad
valorem tax challenge process.
The Task Force’s discussion regarding millage rates focused primarily on the caps contained in article VII, section 9(b) of the Florida
Constitution. That provision limits ad valorem taxes for county pur137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Dem., Auburndale.
Dem., Miami Shores.
See Press Release, supra note 136, at 2.
See id. at 1.
See FLA. AD VALOREM TAX TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE 2, 13 (March 1997) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (summarizing
the Task Force’s July 25, 1996, meeting) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
142. See id. at 13-14 (summarizing comments of Senator Jim Horne).
143. See id. at 15.
144. See id. at 16-17 (summarizing the Task Force’s August 27, 1996, meeting).
145. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE SUMMARY, supra note 3.
146. See DOR DATA PRESENTATION, supra note 49.
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poses, municipal purposes, and school purposes to ten mils each. 147
The millage cap for water management purposes was between .05
mils and one mil for all water management districts. 148 The ACIR report noted that fourteen counties levied ad valorem taxes at the ten
mil cap.149 Seven other counties levied between nine and ten mils. 150
Only one municipality, Greenville, was at its ten mil cap. 151 Fortyseven of the sixty-seven local school districts had tax rates in excess
of nine mils.152
It was suggested that any change to the current ad valorem tax
challenge process that made it easier to overturn the property appraiser’s assessment would have a direct adverse impact on these local governments at or near their cap. These entities could not increase millage rates to off-set any reductions in aggregate taxable
value resulting from successful challenges to the property appraiser’s assessment. This impact would be primarily borne by
“small counties”153 because nineteen of the twenty-one counties at or
near the ten mil cap have populations less than 75,000. 154 Therefore,
the local government representatives on the Task Force urged the
Task Force to proceed cautiously in its review of the burden of proof
issue.
The Task Force spent much of the August meeting discussing the
meaning and significance of the ad valorem tax data gathered by
DOR for the 1994 and 1995 tax years. This data provided a percentage breakdown of the taxable value of each class of property subject
to ad valorem taxation.155 In this regard, real property accounted for
almost 87.4% of the taxable value of all property subject to ad valo-

147. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b).
148. See id. The total millage rates of the water management districts are capped at:
Rate:
District:
.05 mils
Northwest Florida Water Management District
.075 mils
Suwannee River Water Management District
.6 mils
St. Johns River Water Management District
1.0 mils
Southwest Florida Water management District
.80 mils
South Florida Water Management District
See FLA. STAT. § 373.503(3)(a) (1997).
149. See August Tapes, supra note 61 (comments of Marsha Hosack, ACIR); see also
FLORIDA JT. ADVIS. COUNCIL ON INTERGOVTL. REL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES IN
FLORIDA: FOLLOW-UP INFORMATION Fig. 1 (1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.)
(presented at Sept. 12, 1996, meeting of the Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force)
[hereinafter LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES FOLLOW-UP].
150. See August Tapes, supra note 61 (comments of Marsha Hosack, ACIR).
151. See id.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES FOLLOW-UP, supra note 149, at Table 3.
152. See August Tapes, supra note 61 (comments of Marsha Hosack, ACIR).
153. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(17) (1997) (defining “small county” as a county with a population less than 75,000).
154. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES FOLLOW-UP, supra note 149, at Fig. 1. Of the
listed counties, only Alachua and Pasco have populations in excess of 75,000. See id.
155. See DOR DATA PRESENTATION, supra note 49, at 1-8.
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rem taxation in 1995.156 Tangible personal property accounted for
12.5%, and centrally assessed property accounted for the remaining
.1%.157 These percentages were consistent with the 1994 data, 158 and
reflected the reliance on real property for the ad valorem tax base.
The DOR data also contained a breakdown of the number and
“success rate” of petitions filed with the VABs contesting the property appraiser’s determination of value.159 In 1995, taxpayers filed
over 30,000 such petitions and prevailed in 29.7% of those cases. 160
In 1994, over 64,000 petitions were filed, and the taxpayer prevailed
in 39.1% of those cases.161 The estimated fiscal impact of the cases in
which taxpayers prevailed and their assessments were reduced was
over $59 million in 1994 and $19 million in 1995, excluding Dade
County.162 All but seven counties had at least one valuation petition
filed with their VABs in 1995, and all but six counties had one
valuation petition filed in 1994.163 In this regard, one speaker suggested that the Task Force should be concerned with those counties
where few petitions were filed because it may indicate a county-wide
undervaluation of the property subject to ad valorem taxation.164
156. See id. at 1. This amounts to almost $469 billion of taxable value statewide. See
id. (1995 data). On a parcel basis, improved residential real property accounted for almost
67% of the real property. See id. at 5 (43% homestead and 23.7% non-homestead). Commercial and industrial real property made up only 2.7% of the parcels, but represented
21% of the taxable value of all property subject to ad valorem taxation. See id. at 2, 3
(1995 data). These figures were consistent with the 1994 data. See id. at 4, 6.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 2. In 1994, real property made up 87.6% of the taxable value of all
property subject to ad valorem taxation. See id. Tangible personal property accounted for
12.2%, and centrally assessed property made up the remaining .1%. See id.
159. See id. at 9-10. The data also contained the number and percentage of petitions
for exemptions that were filed and granted. See id. In this regard, the VABs granted
48.8% of the exemption petitions filed in 1995 (excluding Dade County) and 50.2% of the
exemption petitions filed in 1994. See id.
160. See id. at 9. The 1995 data does not include petitions filed in Dade County. As of
the date the DOR data was presented to the Task Force, the 1995 Dade County VAB proceedings were still underway. See id. In 1994, nearly 31,000 valuation petitions were filed
in Dade County alone, and taxpayers prevailed in 42.9% of those cases. See id. at 10.
Therefore, the 29.7% “success” rate likely underestimates the actual figure for 1995 once
Dade County is factored in.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 9-10. The 1995 figure does not include data from Dade County because
its VAB proceedings had not been completed as of the Task Force’s August meeting. See
supra note 159. In 1994, Dade County accounted for almost $33.5 million of the estimated
fiscal impact of the reduction in value by the VAB. See DOR DATA PRESENTATION, supra
note 49, at 10. If a similar reduction occurred in Dade County in 1995, the total negative
fiscal impact in 1995 would have been approximately $52.5 million. See id.
163. See DOR DATA PRESENTATION, supra note 49, at 9-10. Of those counties, only Lafayette, Taylor, and Union counties had no valuation petitions filed with their VAB in either 1994 or 1995. See id.
164. See August Tapes, supra note 61 (comments of Stan Beck). Task Force member
Senator William Turner agreed that the issue of under-valuation should be addressed by
the Task Force. See id. (comments of Sen. William Turner). However, this issue never received any serious consideration by the Task Force. Any under-valuation of the county’s
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Local government representatives on the Task Force suggested
that these percentages demonstrated that it is not impossible, as
suggested by proponents of House Bill 557, for taxpayers to satisfy
the “every reasonable hypothesis standard” in existing law. Other
Task Force members, including Representative Starks, suggested
that the 29.7% and 39.1% “success rates” in valuation challenges
would be higher but for the existing burden of proof.165 In sum, the
Task Force members seemed to agree that the DOR data is inconclusive, at best, in determining whether the existing burden of proof
should be changed.
The Task Force also heard presentations from several local government officials regarding the operation of the VAB process within
their jurisdictions.166 One official noted that the most important element of the VAB process was consistency.167 He noted that the process generally worked well where the membership of the VAB, and
thus its decisions, remained consistent from year to year. 168 Without
this consistency, he noted, the public would lose faith in the VAB
process.169 On this issue, Task Force member Representative Lori
Edwards suggested that the Task Force consider changes to the
composition of the VAB to include a taxpayer representative. 170 Local
assessment rolls should be caught by DOR in its review of the rolls pursuant to Rule 12D8, Florida Administrative Code. DOR requires a level of assessment—fair market value to
assessed value—of at least 85% for roll approval. See July Tapes, supra note 24
(comments of Steve Keller). DOR reported that the statewide average is 97.6%. See id.
Whether this 85% standard satisfies the “just valuation” requirements of the Florida Constitution is beyond the scope of this Article. Compare 1996 FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK, supra
note 4, at 134 (suggesting that the elimination of subsections (1) and (8) of section
193.011, Florida Statutes, would essentially require 100% assessments), with DOR,
PRESENTATION TO THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON AD VALOREM TAX - DECEMBER 17, 1996
- JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 8-12 (1996) (on file with Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (discussing
the basis of the 85% standard) [hereinafter DOR DECEMBER PRESENTATION].
165. On this issue, DOR staff conceded that these percentages may overstate the taxpayers’ “success rate” in overcoming the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard because
some of the cases in which the VAB granted the petition resulted from a stipulation by the
property appraiser that an adjustment should be made. See August Tapes, supra note 61
(comments of Lance Larson). But see DOR DATA PRESENTATION, supra note 49, at 12-13
(listing value reductions by property appraiser). The property appraisers suggested that
“success” should be defined as a circumstance where the taxpayer obtained a reduction in
his assessment, whether that reduction was the result of a VAB decision (stipulated or
unstipulated) or a “counter change” after the informal conference with the property appraiser. See August Tapes, supra note 61. Under this definition of “success,” the 29.7%
and 39.1% rates may understate the taxpayer’s “success rate” in contesting the assessment of his property.
166. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 16-17 (summarizing the Task Force’s
August 27, 1996, meeting).
167. See id.; see also August Tapes, supra note 61 (comments of Ron Schultz, Citrus
County Property Appraiser).
168. See August Tapes, supra note 61.
169. See id.
170. See Memorandum from Brian H. Bibeau and T. Kent Wetherell, II, attorneys
with Hopping Green Sams & Smith, P.A., to file 3 (Aug. 28, 1996) (on file with author)
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government representatives on the Task Force suggested that such a
change was not necessary because most counties utilized independent special masters to hear taxpayers’ petitions and make recommendations to the VAB.171 Interestingly, Task Force member Jimmy
Alvarez172 indicated that he would support a mandatory use of special masters.173 Neither of these issues ever received any serious
consideration by the Task Force.
(b) September 1996: Tallahassee
The Task Force continued to focus on the VAB process at its September meeting, and also discussed the development of the “every
reasonable hypothesis” standard in the courts. 174 In this regard, the
Task Force received information from the staff of the Legislative
Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (LCIR) 175 regarding the
ad valorem tax challenge process in other states. Additionally, DOR
staff reported on the use of special masters in the VAB process. 176
This report indicated that twenty-seven counties utilized special
masters,177 and that the costs of the special masters ranged from $40
to $150 per hour.178 The report also indicated that the number of petitions filed with the VAB was relatively small in light of the number
of properties subject to ad valorem taxation.179 The average number
of petitions filed as a percentage of the total number of taxable properties within each county was .83% state-wide. 180 Only six counties

(summarizing the Task Force’s August 27, 1996, meeting) [hereinafter Hopping Green
Memorandum].
171. See id.
172. Bradford County Prop. Appraiser. See Press Release, supra note 136, at 1.
173. See Hopping Green Memorandum, supra note 170, at 3.
174. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 18-19 (summarizing the Task Force’s
September 12, 1996, meeting).
175. LCIR was formerly known as the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). The 1996 Legislature reorganized the committee and changed its name. See
Act effective Nov. 5, 1996, ch. 96-311, §§ 1, 9, 1996 Fla. Laws 1403, 1413 (repealing FLA.
STAT. §§ 163.701 -.708 (1995) and creating FLA. STAT. § 11.70 (Supp. 1996)).
176. See FLA. DOR, ANALYSIS OF VALUE ADJUSTMENT BOARDS AND SPECIAL MASTERS:
1994 ASSESSMENTS (1996) (on file with Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter
VAB/SPECIAL MASTER REPORT].
177. See id. at 3. The counties that utilized special masters are primarily the larger
counties. See id. at 2-3. For example, Broward County employed 44 special masters, and
Dade County employed 29 special masters. These counties generally have the greatest
number of petitions filed with their VABs. See DOR DATA PRESENTATION, supra note 49,
at 9-10. Therefore, a vast majority of the petitions filed statewide are currently most likely
heard by a special master. See VAB/SPECIAL MASTER REPORT, supra note 176; see also
DOR DATA PRESENTATION, supra note 49, at 9-10.
178. See VAB/SPECIAL MASTER REPORT, supra note 176, at 2-3.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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exceeded 1%.181 Stated another way, less than nine taxpayers in
every 1000 file petitions with the VAB challenging the property appraiser’s assessment of their real or tangible personal property.
These statistics suggested that the burden of proof issue affected
very few taxpayers statewide. The Task Force members disagreed,
however, with whether a reduction of the burden of proof would result in an increase in the number of petitions filed with the VAB. It
was clear that these issues would continue to shape the direction of
the Task Force’s debate.
DOR staff presented an overview of the cases in which the courts
developed and discussed the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard.182 In particular, the Task Force discussed Blake v. Xerox Corporation,183 Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen ,184 Walter v. Schuler,185
Walker v. Trump,186 Mastroianni v. Barnett Banks, Inc. ,187 and
Scripps Howard Cable Co. v. Havill .188 The purpose of this presentation was to acquaint the Task Force with the various aspects of the
burden of proof issue. These aspects included the trial and appellate
courts’ roles in establishing value and the factors that may, and the
factors that must, be used by property appraisers when establishing
assessments.189
The Task Force engaged in very little debate during its September meeting. However, the Task Force requested additional information from DOR regarding these cases that proceeded beyond the
VAB stage.190 DOR agreed to compile this information for the Octo-

181. The counties were Dade (4.31%), Glades (2.46%), Broward (1.57%), Palm Beach
(1.35%), Duval (1.15%), and Hillsborough (1.06%). See id.
182. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 19 (summarizing the Task Force’s
September 12, 1996, meeting). For a discussion of this standard, see supra Part II.C.
183. 447 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1984).
184. 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503 (1919).
185. 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965).
186. 549 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
187. 664 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
188. 665 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). This case was cited as an example in which
the taxpayer overcame the “every reasonable hypothesis” burden of proof. See Fla. Ad
Valorem Tax Task Force, tape recordings of proceedings (Sept. 12, 1996) (available at Fla.
DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.); see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 19 (listing cases
discussed at the Task Force’s September 12, 1996, meeting). However, the case does not
stand for that proposition; the property appraiser’s presumption of correctness was lost in
this case because he failed to consider each criterion in section 193.011, Florida Statutes
(1991). See Havill, 665 So. 2d at 1076-77, 1079.
189. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 19 (summarizing the Task Force’s
September 12, 1996, meeting). The Task Force also heard a presentation by Florida State
University College of Law Professor Charles Ehrhardt regarding the various burdens of
proof in Florida law. See id. Professor Ehrhardt also commented on the “hybrid” nature of
the “de novo appeal” to circuit court. See id.; see also supra notes 74-79 and accompanying
text.
190. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 18 (summarizing the Task Force’s
September 12, 1996, meeting).
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ber Task Force meeting.191 At the conclusion of the meeting, Chairman Pajcic reminded the Task Force members that the Governor directed the Task Force to consider several issues in addition to the
burden of proof issue.192 In particular, Chairman Pajcic referred to
the partial-year taxation issue193 and the ad valorem taxation of
computer software.194 Notwithstanding the chairman’s reminder, the
Task Force did not consider the partial-year taxation issue until its
November meeting.
(c) October 1996: Miami
The Task Force continued to focus on the burden of proof issue at
its October meeting.195 Several Dade County employees expressed
their opposition to any changes to the existing burden of proof. In
this regard, the Assistant County Manager suggested that, to the extent a reduction in the burden of proof would enable more taxpayers
to successfully challenge the property appraiser’s assessment, the effect of such a reduction would merely be a reallocation of taxes.196
Another county employee suggested that the “problem” in the area of
ad valorem tax litigation is not the burden of proof itself but that the
VAB members do not always properly understand or apply the bur-

191. See id.
192. See id. at 19.
193. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.d.
194. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.d. The computer software issue relates to the
proper measure of value to be given to computer programs and other software for ad valorem tax purposes. Legislation was introduced in the 1996 Regular Session to define
“computer software” for purposes of ad valorem taxation to include only the value of the
uninstalled medium on which the software is stored, for example disk or tape. See Fla. SB
2226 (1996) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19)); Fla. HB 2273 (1996) (same). The increased value to the computer system resulting from the installation or operation of the
software is not to be included in the software’s value for ad valorem tax purposes. See Fla.
SB 2226 (1996); Fla. HB 2273 (1996). The Task Force never addressed the computer software issue. The Legislature approved a bill during the 1997 Regular Session that was
identical to those considered in 1996. See Act effective June 1, 1997, ch. 97-294, § 1, 1997
Fla. Laws 5333, 5334 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (1997)).
195. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 20-21 (summarizing the Task Force’s
October 24, 1996, meeting). Perhaps the most interesting information brought to the attention of the Task Force during the course of its deliberations was presented at the October meeting. Excerpts from the Dade County real property tax rolls were provided to the
Task Force to demonstrate the range of assessments contained therein. More interesting
than the range of assessments (from $24,000 to $7.3 million) were the identities of the
property owners. Included in the excerpts were Madonna (assessed value $2.1 million),
Sylvester Stallone (assessed value $7.3 million), Miami Heat Coach Pat Riley (assessed
value $4.8 million), and Leona Helmsley (assessed value $4.6 million). See DADE COUNTY,
EXCERPT OF 1996 REAL PROPERTY TAX ROLLS (1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee,
Fla.) (presented to the Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force on Oct. 24, 1996).
196. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 20 (summarizing the comments of
Dr. David Morris at the Task Force’s October 24, 1996, meeting).
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den of proof.197 The Task Force also heard testimony from individuals
who represented taxpayers before the VABs or the courts. These individuals uniformly supported a reduction in the existing burden of
proof.198
DOR staff provided the Task Force with the requested data regarding the outcome of cases “appealed” to circuit court during the
1994 and 1995 tax years.199 Although a significant number of cases
were still pending, the data demonstrated that a settlement is
reached between the property appraiser and the taxpayer in most
cases that proceed beyond the VAB stage.200 For the 1994 tax year,
when a settlement was not reached, the taxpayer prevailed in only
two of the twelve cases (16.7%) in which a final judgment had been
entered.201 Although it is unclear whether or how the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard impacted this “success rate,” this data
added fuel to the argument that taxpayers rarely prevailed in ad
valorem tax challenge cases in circuit court.202
Task Force member Thomas Logue203 offered the first formal written proposal to the Task Force regarding the burden of proof issue. 204
Under this proposal, the property appraiser’s assessment would be
entitled to a presumption of correctness if it were within a “range of
197. See id. at 21 (summarizing comments of Steve Schultz, attorney for Dade
County’s VAB).
198. See id. at 20-21. One speaker noted that the “every reasonable hypothesis standard” is tantamount to a fraud standard. See id. at 21 (summarizing comments of Jeff
Manling); see also German-American Lumber Co. v. Barbee, 59 Fla. 493, 498, 52 So. 292,
294 (1910) (suggesting that fraud must be demonstrated to overturn the property appraiser’s assessment).
199. See FLORIDA DOR, RESULTS OF LITIGATION SURVEYS 1994-1995 (on file with Fla.
DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented to the Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force on October
24, 1996).
200. See id. For example, 28 of the 36 cases filed in Pinellas County in 1994 were settled. See id. at 7.
201. One case was in Palm Beach County, the other in Seminole County. See id. at 7,
8. In the Palm Beach County case, the property appraiser and the VAB determined the
taxable value of the property to be $304,920. See id. at 7. The court reduced this value to
$150,000. See id. In the Seminole County case, the property appraiser and the VAB determined the taxable value of the property to be $1,000,000. See id. at 8. The court reduced this value to $363,200. See id. The 1995 data do not identify any case in which the
property appraiser prevailed in the circuit court; however, the data are relatively incomplete. See id. at 10-16.
202. It is interesting to note that the taxpayer’s “success” rate is lower in circuit court
than it is before the VAB. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (describing taxpayers’ “success rate” before the VAB). This difference is not surprising, however, since
one would expect the courts to be more deferential to the challenged assessment (even in
the absence of the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard), especially where the assessment has already been “upheld” by the VAB.
203. Assistant Dade County Att’y.
204. See THOMAS W. LOGUE, ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO CHANGING THE PRESUMPTION
OF CORRECTNESS TO PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (1996) (available at Fla. DOR,
Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented at the Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force meeting on October 24, 1996) [hereinafter LOGUE PROPOSAL].
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reasonableness.”205 This approach recognized that the various appraisal methodologies often produced several different values and
any one of these values could reflect the true market value of the
property.206 Under the Logue Proposal, so long as the value chosen by
the property appraiser was one of these values, it would fall within
the “range of reasonableness” and would be presumed correct.207
The Logue Proposal would have authorized the VAB or the court
to establish the value in the event the taxpayer overcame the property appraiser’s presumption of correctness. 208 In support of this aspect of the proposal, it was noted that:
Some cases have held that a court can set the assessment at either the Property Appraiser’s value or the taxpayer’s value. If neither number is acceptable, the court must remand for a new assessment. This can be a cumbersome and time-consuming process
that would be subject to a new round of appeals . When the Value
Adjustment Board or court has sufficient information to establish
an assessment based upon the eight criteria [in section 193.011,
Florida Statutes (1996)], it should have the authority to do so.209

The Logue Proposal contained several other components, including a requirement that the VABs use special masters, 210 further limitations on the property appraiser’s right to appeal the VAB’s decision,211 and additional disclosure requirements for taxpayers.212
The Logue Proposal was not discussed in any detail at the October meeting.213 As described below, however, the Task Force debated
the “range of reasonableness” concept at its December meeting.214
205. Id. at 1-2. This standard would replace the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard, which, according to Mr. Logue, is “confusing and contentious.” Id. at 2. To this end,
the proposal did not lower the existing standard, it merely renamed it. See GAYLORD A.
WOOD, JR. & B. JORDAN STUART, THE PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS IN PROPERTY TAX
LITIGATION 4 (1995) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented at the Florida
Ad Valorem Tax Task Force meeting on October 24, 1996); Letter from Steven A. Schultz,
attorney, to Steve Pajcic, Chair of the Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force 2-3 (Nov. 4,
1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (summarizing Mr. Schultz’ presentation to
the Task Force on October 24, 1996) [hereinafter Schultz Letter].
206. See supra Part II.A.1; see also Schultz Letter, supra note 205, at 2 (“Reasonable
men may differ regarding the valuation of property, but ordinarily there is an acceptable
‘range of values’ within which most appraisals will fall.”).
207. See LOGUE PROPOSAL, supra note 204, at 1-2.
208. See id. at 2.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. See id. (“The use of knowledgeable special masters ensures a process that is more
professional and efficient.”); see also supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
211. See LOGUE PROPOSAL, supra note 204, at 2-3 (proposing modifications to the percentages in FLA. STAT. § 194.036(1)(b) (Supp. 1996)).
212. See id. at 3 (proposing a requirement that taxpayers file all supporting documents within 45 days of filing a petition with the VAB to avoid “trial by ambush” before
the VAB).
213. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141 (summarizing the Task Force’s October
24, 1996, meeting).
214. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.e.

214

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:185

(d) November 1996: Tallahassee
The Task Force focused on the partial-year taxation issue for the
first time at its November meeting.215 In this regard, the Task Force
heard a presentation from a representative of the Property Appraisers Association of Florida (PAAF) regarding the history of the
“substantially complete” language in section 192.042, Florida Statutes,216 and its relationship to the partial-year taxation concept. 217
Additionally, LCIR staff outlined some of the legal issues implicated
by partial-year taxation.218
In a nutshell, partial-year taxation is an effort to more fairly apportion ad valorem taxes on improvements to taxable property that
are completed during the tax-year.219 Currently, property is assessed
for ad valorem tax purposes only on January 1 of each year. 220 Improvements to taxable property that are not “substantially complete”221 on January 1, but that are completed during the tax-year,
are not subject to ad valorem taxes until the following year. 222 Critics
argue that the current system results in a significant loss of potential ad valorem tax revenue each year.223 To this end, partial-year
taxation is seen by many as a source of much-needed local govern-

215. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141 at 22-23 (summarizing the Task Force’s
November 21, 1996, meeting).
216. FLA. STAT. § 192.042 (1997).
217. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 22 (summarizing the comments of
Larry Levy, who represents PAAF, at the Task Force’s November 21, 1996, meeting); see
also Letter from Larry E. Levy to Representative Bo Johnson, Speaker of the House of
Representatives 2-3 (Mar. 19, 1993) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (provided to
the Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force at its meeting on November 12, 1996) [hereinafter
1993 Levy Letter].
218. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 22 (summarizing comments of Dick
Drennen and Janet Bowman at Task Force’s November 21, 1996, meeting).
219. See PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
220. See FLA. STAT. § 192.042 (1997).
221. An improvement is deemed “substantially complete[]” if “the improvement or
some self-sufficient unit within it can be used for the purpose for which it was constructed.” FLA. STAT. § 192.042(1) (1997). In the context of real property, improvements
are not generally considered “substantially complete” until a certificate of occupancy is issued. See, e.g., Markam v. Yankee Clipper Hotel, Inc., 427 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 4th DCA
1983) (affirming the finding that the building was not substantially complete where evidence included the fact that the certificate of occupancy was not issued until after January
1); John Henry Jones, Inc. v. Lanier, 376 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979) (reasoning
that whether the building was eligible to receive a certificate of occupancy on January 1 is
evidence of substantial completion).
222. See PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
223. See, e.g., The Partial Year Solution, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 3, 1997, at A12; Getting
a Free Ride, JACKSONVILLE TIMES-UNION, Feb 8, 1997, at A16. One source estimates that
partial-year taxation could yield as much as $197 million in revenue. See 1996 FLORIDA
TAX HANDBOOK, supra note 4; see also PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3,
at Table 1 (estimating potential county, school district, and municipal revenue for partialyear taxation at approximately $80 million).
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ment revenue.224 The issue had been subject to considerable legislative debate during the past several sessions, but the Legislature
failed to approve any legislation on the subject.225
If partial-year taxation were implemented, ad valorem taxes
would be collected on improvements to taxable property on a pro rata
basis based upon the number of months during the tax year that the
improvement was complete.226 An assessment must be done at the
time the improvement is completed and separate “interim” assessment rolls must be maintained.227 Because of the administrative
burdens involved with partial-year taxation, county property appraisers have traditionally opposed its implementation.228
An example is helpful in understanding the operation of partialyear taxation. Assume that the construction of a single-family residential home commenced on October 1, 1996, and was completed on
July 1, 1997. Further, assume that on January 1, 1997, the home
was only thirty percent complete and thus uninhabitable. Finally,
assume that upon completion the home would have a taxable value
of $100,000 (excluding the value of the land), and the combined millage rate applicable to the property is twenty mils.229
Under the current system, because the home was not substantially complete on January 1, 1997, the taxpayer would not owe any
ad valorem taxes on the home. The home would be assessed for the
first time on the 1998 tax rolls. If partial-year taxation was implemented, the taxpayer would be assessed a pro rata share of the 1997
ad valorem taxes. Because the home was complete for six months
during 1997—July 1 through December 31—the taxpayer would owe
six-twelfths of the ad valorem taxes that would have been owed had
the property been assessed on January 1, 1997. In this regard, the

224. See, e.g., Dina Nelson, State Tax Law Costing Counties Millions, PALM BCH.
POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at B1; Craig Sikes, Valuable Property, ORLANDO SENT., Apr. 10, 1997,
at A22; see also LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-13.
225. See Fla. HB 1693 (1995) (died in committee); Fla. HB 809 (1996) (died in committee); Fla. SB 402 (1996) (died on calendar); Fla. HJR 1449 (1997) (proposing an amendment to FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2) (carried over to 1998 session); Fla. SJR 1236 (1997)
(proposing an amendment to FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4) (died in committee).
226. See PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
227. See, e.g., Fla. SB 402, §§ 3, 6 (1996).
228. See, e.g., 1993 Levy Letter, supra note 217, at 4 (“A partial-year assessment roll
simply is not administratively feasible.”); see also PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 40-43 (discussing administrative costs from instituting partial year assessment).
229. The average aggregate millage rate imposed on property within Florida is 22.26
mils. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES REPORT, supra note 3, at A-2-A-3. This rate reflects the millage imposed by each taxing authority with jurisdiction over a parcel, excluding the applicable municipality. See id.
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taxpayer would owe $1000 in ad valorem taxes on the property. 230
These taxes would be imposed at the time the improvements were
completed on July 1, 1997.231
There are several constitutional concerns implicated by the partial-year taxation concept.232 Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court
has interpreted article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution to
prohibit different treatment of real and tangible personal property. 233
Therefore, to the extent that partial-year taxation proposals considered by the Legislature in recent years would have applied only to
improvements to real property, these proposals may have been unconstitutional.234 Moreover, in light of the Save Our Homes Amendment,235 it is uncertain whether improvements to homestead property could be assessed on any date other than January 1.236
Closely related to the issue of partial-year taxation is section
192.042, Florida Statutes.237 This statute contains the restriction on
assessing property that is not “substantially complete.” 238 The predecessor of this statute was adopted by the Legislature in 1961 at the
request of the home-building industry.239 A related provision was
added in 1980 at the request of the electric utility industry to benefit
incomplete tangible personal property.240
The PAAF representative suggested to the Task Force that the
repeal of the “substantially complete” language would address many
230. The taxes are computed by multiplying the taxable value by the millage rate and
by the ratio that reflects the number of months that the improvements were completed
during 1997—$100,000 x (.001 x 20) x 6/12 = $1000.
231. See, e.g., Fla. HB 809 (1996) (providing for partial year assessment).
232. See 1993 Levy Letter, supra note 217, at 3; Memorandum from Larry E. Levy,
General Counsel, Property Appraiser’s Association of Florida, to The Honorable Marjorie
Turnbull, The Honorable Stephen B. Feren, & The Honorable Ken Pruitt, Members of the
Florida Legislature 1, 3 (Mar. 25, 1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (arguing
that the proposed 1996 partial-year taxation legislation unconstitutionally distinguished
between real and personal property) [hereinafter 1996 Levy Memorandum].
233. See Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1974).
But see Colding v. Herzog, 467 So. 2d 980, 983 (Fla. 1985) (suggesting that the Legislature
could classify or exclude certain property from ad valorem taxation where the costs associated with collection of the tax would exceed the revenue generated).
234. See PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 27-29; 1996 Levy Memorandum, supra note 232, at 2-3.
235. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, 4(c); see also supra notes 52-54 and accompanying
text.
236. See PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 31-32.
237. FLA. STAT. 192.042 (1997).
238. Id.
239. See Act effective June 12, 1961, ch. 61-240, § 1, 1961 Fla. Laws 422, 423 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 193.11(4) (1961)). The current language in section 192.042, Florida Statutes (1997), was added in 1970. See Act effective January 1, 1971, ch. 70-243, § 4, 1970
Fla. Laws 709, 712; see also 1993 Levy Letter, supra note 217, at 2; 1996 Levy Memorandum, supra note 232, at 2.
240. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(11)(d) (1997) (defining “construction work in process”);
see also 1993 Levy Letter, supra note 217, at 2; 1996 Levy Memorandum, supra note 232,
at 2.
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of the concerns raised by the proponents of the partial-year taxation
without the administrative burdens of implementing partial-year
taxation.241 Moreover, the constitutional issues implicated by partialyear taxation would not be affected by the repeal of the
“substantially complete” language.242 In this regard, the property appraiser would assess all improvements to property on January 1,
even if such improvements were still “under construction” on that
date.243
Chairman Pajcic polled the members to determine whether the
Task Force’s recommendations to the Governor should advocate a
repeal of the “substantially complete” language. 244 Although a number of the Task Force members seemed to support the repeal of the
“substantially complete” language, the consensus of the Task Force
was to request additional information on the issue from DOR staff
prior to taking any formal action.245
The Task Force also discussed the burden of proof issue at its November meeting. In this regard, the Task Force focused on an outline
prepared by Task Force member Vicki Weber 246 that contained several “principles to be used in guiding any revisions of the assessment
challenge process.”247 The Task Force also reviewed a proposal from
Task Force member Linda Loomis Shelley 248 regarding possible revisions to House Bill 557.249

241. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 22 (summarizing comments of Larry
Levy at the Task Force’s November 21, 1996, meeting).
242. See 1993 Levy Letter, supra note 217, at 2; 1996 Levy Memorandum, supra note
232, at 2. But see PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 20-21 (suggesting
that a percentage of completion assessment would contravene the constitutional requirement that property be assessed at “just value,” not a percentage thereof).
243. See PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
244. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 23 (summarizing the Task Force’s
November 21, 1996, meeting).
245. See id. at 22.
246. Attorney, Steel Hector & Davis, Tallahassee, Fla. Ms. Weber previously served as
General Counsel of DOR.
247. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 23 (summarizing the Task Force’s November 21, 1996, meeting).
248. Chief of Staff, Exec. Office of the Gov.
249. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 23 (summarizing the Task Force’s
November 21, 1996, meeting). Ms. Shelley proposed the following revisions to House Bill
557 as vetoed by the Governor:
In any administrative or judicial action in which a taxpayer challenges an ad
valorem tax assessment, the denial of an exemption, or the denial of classified
status, the property appraiser’s assessment or determination shall be presumed correct if the property appraiser has complied with the requirements of
law and followed recognized professional standards of appraisal practice shall
be upheld unless the taxpayer proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
value is not within the reasonable range of value. The taxpayer shall have the
burden of overcoming the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence, but
shall not have the burden of presenting proof which excludes every reasonable
hypothesis of a legal assessment.
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Each of these proposals acknowledged that the property appraiser
was entitled to a presumption of correctness, especially as to matters
“within [the] appraiser’s professional judgment.” 250 The proposals
also contained reference to a “range of reasonableness” concept
raised by Task Force member Thomas Logue at the October meeting.251 However, the proposals differed as to the degree of proof necessary to overcome the appraiser’s presumption of correctness. Weber’s “principles” referred to a preponderance of the evidence standard252 while the Shelley proposal would use a clear and convincing
evidence standard.253 Neither proposal directly addressed the issue
of the ability of the VAB or the court to establish the assessment
without remanding the case to the property appraiser. 254 It was clear,
however, that these proposals would play a key role in shaping the
Task Force’s ultimate recommendation on the burden of proof issue.
(e) December 1996: Jacksonville
At its December meeting in Jacksonville, the Task Force again focused primarily on partial-year taxation and the repeal of the
“substantially complete” standard.255 The Task Force also briefly discussed another alternative concept, the “proprietary fee.” 256 To this
LINDA LOOMIS SHELLEY, ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE FOR HB 557 (available at Fla. DOR,
Tallahassee, Fla.) (strike-through and underscore in original) (presented at the Florida Ad
Valorem Tax Task Force meeting on November 12, 1996) [hereinafter SHELLEY PROPOSAL].
250. VICKI WEBER, CURRENT CONDITIONS AND PRINCIPLES GUIDING REVISION OF
ASSESSMENT CHALLENGE PROCESS 2 (1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.)
(presented at the Florida Ad Valorem Tax Task Force meeting on November 12, 1996)
[hereinafter WEBER PROPOSAL I]. In both proposals, the appraiser’s determination as to
matters involving questions of law, such as entitlement to an exemption or classified use
status, would not be entitled to a presumption of correctness. See id.; accord SHELLEY
PROPOSAL, supra note 249 (stricken language); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
251. See SHELLEY PROPOSAL, supra note 249; WEBER PROPOSAL I, supra note 250, at 2
(“principle” no. 5).
252. See WEBER PROPOSAL I, supra note 250, at 2 (“principle” nos. 4, 5).
253. See SHELLEY PROPOSAL, supra note 249, at 1 (“[T]he property appraiser’s assessment . . . shall be upheld unless the taxpayer proves by clear and convincing evidence that
the value is not within the reasonable range of value.”). The Shelley Proposal limited the
applicability of this lower burden of proof to valuation cases. See id.
254. Cf. WEBER PROPOSAL I, supra note 250, at 3 (“Care should be taken to ensure that
any revisions to the assessment appeals process do not render it too costly and burdensome a process for both taxpayers and government.”); SHELLEY PROPOSAL, supra note 249,
at 1 (noting that a potential refinement to her proposal is “[a]uthorization for the VAB or
court to prescribe a new value given sufficient evidence in the record”).
255. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 24-25 (summarizing the Task Force’s
December 17, 1996, meeting).
256. See id. This proposal, discussed briefly at the November meeting, would authorize local governments to impose a fee on developers as a condition for the receipt of a certificate of occupancy for new construction. See id. at 25 (summarizing the comments of
Ken Wilkinson at the Task Force’s November 21, 1996, meeting); PARTIAL YEAR ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 17-18. This fee is similar to the traditional “impact
fee” and, therefore, must be based upon the cost of providing public services to the prop-

1998]

AD VALOREM TAX VALUATION

219

end, DOR staff presented a report to the Task Force regarding the
relative costs and benefits of each of these alternatives.257
In sum, this report indicated that the most “equitable” of these alternatives was partial-year taxation.258 Partial-year taxation would
require the highest start-up costs, but low annual administrative
costs.259 Conversely, the repeal of the “substantially complete” doctrine would require low start-up costs, but higher annual administrative costs than partial-year taxation.260 Interestingly, the DOR report referred to the equity of the repeal of “substantially complete”
as “poor.”261 Notwithstanding this comparison, the Task Force continued to favor the repeal of “substantially complete” over partialyear taxation.262 Accordingly, the Task Force turned its attention to
issues associated with implementation of the repeal of “substantially
complete.” Specifically, the Task Force considered the appropriate
method for valuing the improvements.
One alternative discussed was the valuation of the improvement
based upon its value as an incomplete structure. This approach
would likely focus on the value of the materials and labor that had
been put into the improvements to date. Because of the obvious difficulties in arriving at such a valuation, the Task Force moved away
from this alternative.263 Instead, the Task Force focused on valuation
of improvements based upon their “percentage of completion” on
January 1.264 Under this approach, the taxable value of the incomplete improvement would reflect a percentage of the estimated value
of the completed improvement. In this regard, the taxpayer in the
above example would owe $600 in ad valorem taxes on his incomplete home for the 1997 tax year.265

erty for the remainder of the tax year; in other words, the property’s proportionate share
of the cost of these public services. In this regard, the “proprietary fee” is distinguishable
from partial-year taxation in that the fee is not tied to the value of the improvements.See
DOR DECEMBER PRESENTATION, supra note 164, at 7. Local government representatives
on the Task Force supported the concept of the “proprietary fee” but objected to the need
for any enabling legislation; instead, they argued that the “home rule” authority of local
governments currently authorize such fees. See Fla. Ad Valorem Tax Task Force, tape recordings of proceedings (Dec. 17, 1996) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.)
[hereinafter December Tapes]. In fact, Lee County currently imposes “proprietary fees.”
See id.; DOR DECEMBER PRESENTATION, supra note 164, at 6.
257. See DOR DECEMBER PRESENTATION, supra note 164, at 7.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. Id. The report noted that improvements started after January 1 but completed
within 12 months (before December 31 of the same year) would still avoid taxation for the
period that the improvements were completed during that year. See id.
262. See December Tapes, supra note 256.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. This figure is computed as follows: $100,000 x 30% x (.001 x 20) = $600.
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Task Force member Leveda Brown266 suggested that the Task
Force recommend a repeal of “substantially complete” as a compromise to the partial-year taxation concept.267 The Task Force never
formally voted on her suggestion, and Chairman Pajcic directed the
Task Force staff to prepare a formal proposal on the issue for the
Task Force’s consideration at its next meeting. 268 Ultimately, the
Task Force was unable to reach a consensus on the repeal of
“substantially complete” or the partial-year taxation issues. 269 Instead, the Task Force recommended to the Governor and the Legislature that the issue should be referred to the Local Government Finance Study Commission II for further study.270
The Task Force also briefly discussed the “burden of proof” issue
at its December meeting.271 This discussion continued to focus on the
“range of reasonableness” concept raised at prior meetings; 272 however, the Task Force was never able to quantify this range.273 As a
266. County Commissioner, Alachua County.
267. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 24 (summarizing the Task Force’s
December 17, 1996, meeting).
268. See id.
269. See id. at 3. The partial-year taxation issue received no significant legislative attention during the 1997 Regular Session. Joint resolutions were introduced to amend the
Florida Constitution to authorize taxation of improvements to real property on a partialyear basis. See Fla. HJR 1449 (1997) (proposing an amendment to FLA. CONST. art VII, §
2); Fla. SJR 1236 (1997) (proposing an amendment to FLA. CONST. art VII, § 4). In the
Senate, the joint resolution was considered by only one of its three committees of reference. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 108, SJR 1236. In the House, the joint resolution was never
referred to committee. See id., HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 293, HJR 1449. The partial
year taxation issue was debated in various forums after the 1997 Regular Session. A conceptual proposal to authorize partial-year taxation is before the Constitution Revision
Commission. See COMMISSIONER ANTHONY, PROPOSAL NO. 51, CRC 2-77A-pr (visited Nov.
13, 1997) <http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/pdf/0051fp.pdf> (proposing a revision to article VII,
section 4 of the Florida Constitution). The Funding Committee of the Governor’s Commission on Education recommended that local school districts be authorized “to impose
property taxes on a partial-year basis.” COMMISSION ON EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOV.,
UNMET EDUCATION FACILITIES NEEDS: REPORT OF THE FUNDING COMMITTEE 4 (1997)
(Recommendation 2C).
270. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 3. The 1996 Legislature established
the Commission on Local Government II to review the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the “creation, organization, structure, powers, duties, financing, and
service delivery capacity of local governments.” Act effective May 29, 1996, ch. 96-266, §
1(1), 1996 Fla. Laws 1041, 1042 (emphasis added). The Commission was to provide its recommendations to the Governor and Legislature prior to the 1997 and 1998 Regular Sessions. See id. § 1(3).
271. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 24 (summarizing the Task Force’s
December 17, 1996, meeting). Jacksonville Mayor John Delaney spoke to the Task Force
regarding the burden of proof issue. See id. Mayor Delaney suggested that a reduction in
the burden of proof would not benefit the average Florida property owner. See id. Instead,
he suggested that such a reduction would primarily benefit big business. See December
Tapes, supra note 256.
272. See December Tapes, supra note 256.
273. The Task Force considered defining this range as a percentage of variation between the property appraiser’s assessment and the value urged by the taxpayer. See id.
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result, many Task Force members, including Senator Horne and
Representative Starks, were skeptical about the benefits of the
“range of reasonableness” approach. Moreover, to the extent that the
“range of reasonableness” was considered a statutory codification of
the existing “every reasonable hypothesis standard,” it would not
address the fundamental concerns that resulted in the passage of
House Bill 557 in 1996. In this regard, it was clear that if the Task
Force’s recommendations were to be embraced by Senator Horne and
Representative Starks, they would need to incorporate a change—
that is, a reduction—in the current burden of proof. A majority of
members of the Task Force appeared to support such a reduction;
however, the extent of this reduction—preponderance of the evidence
or clear and convincing evidence—had not yet been determined.274
(f) February 1997: Tallahassee
The Task Force met twice in February in an effort to finalize its
recommendations.275 An ad hoc “drafting committee” of the Task
Force met on February 20 to consider several proposals offered by
Task Force members.276
One of these proposals, submitted by Task Force member Thomas
Logue, included the “range of reasonableness” concept. 277 Under this
proposal, the property appraiser’s presumption of correctness would
not be lost unless the taxpayer demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that the property appraiser’s assessment was outside
of the “range.”278 To this end, the presumption of correctness was
linked to the value reached by the property appraiser. Another proposal, offered by Task Force member Vicki Weber, essentially linked
the property appraiser’s presumption of correctness to the methodolUnder this proposal, the VAB or the court would uphold the property appraiser’s assessment unless the taxpayer demonstrated that the assessment was more than a specified
percentage, for example, 10% greater than the taxpayer’s valuation of the property. See
id.
274. See id.
275. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 2 (listing seven Task Force members
as present at this meeting).
276. See id.
277. See THOMAS W. LOGUE, COMPROMISE PROPOSAL—STEP DOWN THE STANDARD 2
(1997) (available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented at the February 20, 1997,
meeting) [hereinafter LOGUE PROPOSAL II]. This range was defined as follows:
"Reasonable range of values,” shall mean the permissible variation in estimates of fair market value that result[s] when professionals, with expertise in
appraising and assessing property, exercise professional judgment without material error in applying legal, appraising, and assessing principles to determine
fair market value. The reasonable range of values will differ from case to case
and from property to property . . . . Under no circumstances does the
“reasonable range of values” include values that exceed just value.
Id. at 1.
278. See id. at 1. A similar proposal was offered by Task Force member Bill Suber.
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ogy used by the appraiser in reaching the assessment. 279 Both of
these proposals would have required the use of special masters by
the VAB, and would have authorized the VAB or the court to establish the assessment in the event the property appraiser’s assessment
is overturned and there was sufficient evidence in the record to support another assessment.280
The full Task Force debated these proposals at length at its final
meeting on February 21.281 Ultimately, the Task Force settled on a
fine-tuned version of the Weber proposal, except for the suggestion to
require the use of special masters by the VAB. 282 The Task Force also
considered but rejected a suggestion that the recommended standard
apply to pending actions in which a final judgment had not been entered.283 Instead, the Task Force recommended that the new standard apply prospectively only.284
2. The “Compromise”: The Task Force’s Recommendations
The Task Force recommended that the following language be
added as subsection (7) of section 194.171, Florida Statutes:

279. See VICKI WEBER, REVISED WORKING PROPOSAL (1997) (available at Fla. DOR,
Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented at the February 20, 1997 “drafting committee” meeting)
[hereinafter WEBER PROPOSAL II]. Under this proposal, the property appraiser’s presumption of correctness is lost if the taxpayer proves that
(a) the property appraiser’s assessment is not based on reasonable appraisal
practices applicable to the type of property at issue, or (b) the property appraiser’s assessment is based on appraisal practices which are different from
the appraisal practices generally applied by the property appraiser to similar
property within the county.
Id. (emphasis added). Unless the presumption is lost, the taxpayer has the burden of overcoming the presumption with clear and convincing evidence “which proves that the appraiser’s assessment is incorrect.” Id. A similar proposal was offered by Task Force member Elliot Messer. See ELLIOT MESSER, ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE IN HB 557 (1997)
(available at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented at the February 20, 1997 “drafting
committee” meeting). The Messer Proposal retained the preponderance of the evidence
standard to overcome the property appraiser’s assessment; however, the proposal would
have added the following language: “If the Court finds upon clear and convincing evidence
that the contested assessment is in excess of just value, the taxpayer shall be entitled to
judicial relief, including an ordered reduction in the just value.” Id.
280. See WEBER PROPOSAL II, supra note 279, at 1-2; LOGUE PROPOSAL II, supra note
277, at 2.
281. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 26.
282. Compare id. at 27 with WEBER PROPOSAL II, supra note 279.
283. A proposal discussed by the Task Force would have included an effective date as
follows: “This act shall take effect upon becoming a law, and shall apply to actions pending
as of the effective date of this act in which unnecessary final judgment has not been entered.” FLORIDA AD VALOREM TAX TASK FORCE, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO HB 445 (available
at Fla. DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.) (presented at the February 21, 1997 Florida Ad Valorem
Tax Task Force meeting).
284. The Task Force recommended that the new standard apply to challenges arising
out of the 1997 tax rolls. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 2-3.

1998]

AD VALOREM TAX VALUATION

223

In any administrative or judicial action in which a taxpayer challenges an ad valorem tax assessment of value, the property appraiser’s assessment shall be presumed correct. This presumption
of correctness is lost if the taxpayer shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that either the property appraiser has failed to consider properly the criteria in s. 193.011 or if the property appraiser’s assessment is arbitrarily based on appraisal practices
which are different from the appraisal practices generally applied
by the property appraiser to comparable property within the same
class and within the same county. If the presumption of correctness is lost, the taxpayer shall have the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the appraiser’s assessment is
in excess of just value. If the presumption of correctness is retained, the taxpayer shall have the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the appraiser’s assessment is in excess of
just value. In no case shall the taxpayer have the burden of proving that the property appraiser’s assessment is not supported by
any reasonable hypothesis of a legal assessment. If the property
appraiser’s assessment is determined to be erroneous, the Value
Adjustment Board or the Court can establish the assessment if
there exists competent, substantial evidence in the record, which
cumulatively meets the requirements of s. 193.011. If the record
lacks competent, substantial evidence meeting the just value criteria of s. 193.011, the matter shall be remanded to the property
appraiser with appropriate directions from the Value Adjustment
Board or the Court.285

The Task Force’s recommendation contained four interrelated
components.286 First, it reaffirmed the long-standing proposition that
the property appraiser’s assessment is generally entitled to a presumption of correctness. Second, it recognized that this presumption
of correctness may be lost in certain limited circumstances. Third, it
affirmatively rejected the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard.
Finally, it clarified that the VAB or the court has the authority to establish the assessment where the property appraiser’s assessment is
overturned and the record contains sufficient evidence to establish
the assessment.
B. The “Rubber Stamp”: House Bill 445
Representative Starks and Senator Horne each filed bills in the
1997 Regular Session on the burden of proof issue. 287 House Bill 445
285. Id.
286. See discussion infra Part IV.
287. See Fla. HB 445 (1997); Fla. SB 134 (1997). The bills again had significant bipartisan support. Ninety members were listed as co-sponsors of House Bill 445, and
twenty-two members were listed as co-sponsors of Senate Bill 134. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL
LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 217,
HB 445; id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 35, SB 134.
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and Senate Bill 134, were prefiled prior to the completion of the Task
Force’s work, and were identical to the initial versions of the 1996
legislation;288 however, it was expected that they were to be used as
vehicles for implementing the Task Force’s final recommendations.
1. House Bill 445 and Senate Bill 134 Move Through the
Legislative Process
Both bills were placed on committee agendas early in the session.289 The House Community Affairs Committee unanimously approved House Bill 445 with one amendment on the second day of
session, and the House Finance and Tax Committee unanimously
approved it on the following day.290 The Senate Judiciary committee
unanimously approved Senate Bill 134 as a committee substitute on
the third day of the session.291 Committee Substitute for Senate Bill
134 and House Bill 445, as amended, replaced the language in the
original bills with the Task Force’s “compromise” language.292
House Bill 445 was placed on a “fast-track” in the House. It was
withdrawn from the General Government Appropriations Committee, its last committee of reference,293 ranked by the Governmental
Responsibility Council294 and sent to the House Floor for a vote. On
288. House Bill 445 was prefiled on February 6, 1997. See id., HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 217, HB 445. Senate Bill 134 was prefiled on January 3, 1997. See id., HISTORY
OF SENATE BILLS at 35, SB 134.
289. Prior to the session, the House Finance and Tax Committee held a special workshop on House Bill 445 in Orlando. See id., HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 217, HB 445. The
Task Force did not hold a meeting in the Orlando area, and the purpose of holding the
workshop in that area was to solicit additional public comment on the burden of proof issue. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 10-11 (listing locations of Task Force
meetings). At the workshop, House Bill 445, as well as the Task Force’s recommendation,
were discussed.
290. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 217, HB 445. The amendment adopted by the Committee on
Community Affairs substituted the language in the original bill with the Task Force’s
“compromise” language. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Comm’y Aff., Amendment 1 to HB 445
(1997) (on file with comm.).
291. See Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, SB 134 (1997) Vote Record (Mar. 6, 1997) (on file
with comm.); see also FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 35, SB 134.
292. Compare CS for SB 134 (1997) and Fla. H.R. Comm. on Comm’y Aff., Amendment
1 to HB 445 (1997), with TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 141, at 2-3.
293. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS, at 217, HB 445.
294. See id. Once a bill is reported out of all of its committees of reference, it must be
ranked by the “council” with substantive jurisdiction over the first committee of reference
before the bill may be heard on the House Floor. See FLA. H.R. RULES 45, 46(a), 135 (199698). The ranking of bills by “councils” is one of the changes to the legislative process implemented by House Speaker Daniel Webster (Repub., Orlando) and the Republican majority in the House. The bill’s ranking determines the order of its consideration on the
House Floor. See id. FLA. HOUSE RULES 128, 134 (1996-98). House Bill 445 was ranked as
the first bill on the Government Responsibility Council Calendar of March 27, 1997. See
FLA. H.R. JOUR. 374 (Reg. Sess. 1997).
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April 2, the House approved House Bill 445 by a vote of 114 to 0 and
sent it to the Senate.295 House Bill 445 languished in the Senate
while the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 134 awaited a hearing by the Senate Ways and Means Committee, its final committee of
reference.296
On April 23, the Senate Ways and Means Committee unanimously approved the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 134,
which was then sent to the Senate Floor for a vote. 297 The Senate
substituted House Bill 445 for the Committee Substitute for Senate
Bill 134, and unanimously approved it.298
2. The Governor Signs House Bill 445 Into Law
House Bill 445 was presented to Governor Chiles on May 8,
1997.299 The Governor signed the bill on May 23, and it became effective on that date.300 The analysis of House Bill 445 prepared by
the Governor’s Office stated that “[t]he Governor supports this
measure as a good compromise between fair and equitable taxation
and taxpayers’ rights.”301
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE NEW STANDARD IN SECTION 194.301,
FLORIDA STATUTES
As noted above, new section 194.301, Florida Statutes, contained
four interrelated parts. Together, these parts reflected a clear shift
295. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS, at 217, HB 445. Prior to approving the bill, the House adopted a
substitute amendment to the amendment adopted in the Committee on Community Affairs. The substitute amendment, offered by Representative Starks, relocated the proposed language from section 194.171(7), Florida Statutes, to a newly created Part III of
chapter 194, Florida Statutes. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 350 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 1, 1997) (creating
FLA. STAT. § 194.301). This relocation was necessary because section 194.171, Florida
Statutes, relates only to circuit court tax-challenge cases, while the proposed change to the
burden of proof is intended to apply in cases before the VAB as well as those in circuit
court. The substitute amendment made no substantive changes to the Task Force’s
“compromise” language.
296. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 217, HB 445.
297. See id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS, at 35, CS for SB 134. The committee approved
the bill by a vote of 27 to 0. See Fla. S. Comm. on Ways and Means, CS for SB 134 (1997)
Vote Record (Apr. 23, 1997) (on file with comm.).
298. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 217, HB 445. The bill was approved by a vote of 40 to 0. See
FLA. S. JOUR. 698 (Reg. Sess. 1997).
299. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1997 HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 217, HB 445.
300. See Act effective May 23, 1997, ch. 97-85, § 2, 1997 Fla. Laws 503, 504. Section 2
of the act provided that the new standards in section 194.301, Florida Statutes, applied to
assessments included in the 1997 tax rolls. See id.
301. Executive Office of the Gov., Office of Legis. Aff., Legislative Bill Analysis, HB
445, 3 (Apr. 30, 1997) (on file with Exec. Office of the Gov., Office of Legis Aff.).
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in policy regarding the disposition of ad valorem tax challenge cases
in Florida.
A. Presumption of Correctness
Section 194.301, Florida Statutes, reaffirmed the long-standing
proposition that the property appraiser’s assessment is presumed to
be correct. To this end, the Legislature has reaffirmed the holdings
of Folsom and its progeny to the extent that they recognized this
presumption of correctness.
The presumption of correctness is rebuttable. 302 In this regard,
two types of rebuttable presumptions are recognized in Florida:
“bubble bursting” presumptions and “burden shifting” presumptions.303 A presumption established to implement public policy is a
“burden shifting” presumption.304 The presumption of correctness afforded to the property appraiser’s assessment is based upon policy
considerations305 and, therefore, is a “burden shifting” presumption.306 Accordingly, the taxpayer has the burden to produce evidence
to demonstrate the non-existence of the fact presumed—that is, that
the property appraiser’s assessment is not correct. 307 The amount of
evidence that the taxpayer must produce to rebut and overcome this
presumption is discussed below.
It is important to note that this presumption of correctness applies only to the property appraiser’s determination of value. Unlike
House Bill 557 in 1996, section 194.301, Florida Statutes, does not
statutorily recognize a presumption of correctness in the context of
“the denial of an exemption or the denial of classified status.” 308 This
distinction appears to be based upon a recognition by the Task Force
that valuation determinations are matters within the “appraiser’s
professional judgment” while the other determinations are more ap-

302. Conclusive, or non-rebuttable, presumptions are not valid in Florida. See
Straughn v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 326 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1979); EHRHARDT, supra
note 119, § 302.1.
303. See FLA. STAT. § 90.302 (1997); see also EHRHARDT, supra note 119, § 301.1.
304. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 90.303 (1997).
305. See, e.g., City of Tampa v. Palmer, 89 Fla. 514, 520, 105 So. 115, 117 (1925) (“The
good faith of tax officers and the validity of their official actions are presumed . . . .”);
German-American Lumber Co. v. Barbee, 59 Fla. 493, 498, 52 So. 292, 294 (1910) (“The
law contemplates that a wide discretion be accorded to the tax assessor in the valuation of
property for the purposes of taxation.”); accord Blake v. Xerox, 447 So. 2d 1348, 1350 (Fla.
1984); see also EHRHARDT, supra note 119, § 304.1 n.10.
306. See Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 416 So. 2d 1133, 1141
(Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
307. See id. at 1141; FLA. STAT. §§ 90.302(2), .304 (1997); see also EHRHARDT, supra
note 119, §§ 302.2, 304.1.
308. Fla. HB 557 § 1 (1996) (enrolled version); compare id. with FLA. STAT. § 194.301
(1997).
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propriately characterized as legal determinations. 309 In this regard,
cases involving exemptions or classified status typically require a
more objective analysis than cases in which the county property appraiser’s subjective valuation of the property is being challenged.310
In September 1997, DOR proposed an amendment to the rules
governing the VAB process to delete the reference to the “every reasonable hypothesis” standard and to incorporate the new burdens of
proof from section 194.301.311 DOR proposed to amend rule 12D10.003(3), Florida Administrative Code, as follows:
A county property appraiser’s determination is entitled to a presumption of correctness. The petitioning taxpayer has the burden
to prove that the property appraiser’s determination was incorrect.
The presumption of correctness can be properly rebutted as described in section 194.301, Florida Statutes only by evidence which
excludes every reasonable hypothesis of a legal assesment. Homer
v. Dadeland Shopping Center, Inc., 229 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1969).312

This proposed rule amendment is inconsistent with section 194.301
because it does not limit the property appraiser’s presumption of correctness to determinations of value.313 This inconsistency was
brought to DOR’s attention,314 and DOR subsequently withdrew the
proposed rule amendment.315

309. See WEBER PROPOSAL I, supra note 250, at 2. This distinction is also supported by
the fact that the policy underlying the rule of judicial restraint applied in the context of
valuation cases is not implicated in non-valuation cases. See supra note 84.
310. This is not to say that such cases are “easier.” Instead, they require little or no
appraisal expertise. In fact, these cases generally turn on the legal interpretation given to
the statutory provision granting the exemption or classified status. See, e.g., St. Petersburg Kennel Club v. Smith, 662 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (determining
whether “greyhound dogs” are “livestock” for purposes of qualifying for the agricultural
classification); Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072, 1073-74 (Fla. 1994)
(determining whether a race track is a “public purpose” for purposes of qualifying for the
government property exemption).
311. See Fla. Admin. W. 4879, 4879-80 (Sept. 12, 1997).
312. Id. at 4880 (strike through and underline original).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 308-10.
314. See Letter from Victoria L. Weber to Steve Keller, DOR Assistant General Counsel, (Aug. 13, 1997) (available at DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.). Ms. Weber commented that:
I believe that the Task Force consciously altered the 1997 legislation to render
the presumption/burden language applicable only to valuation issues wherein
the argument can be made that the appraiser is exercising professional judgment in an arena that has been recognized by the courts as “an art, not a science.”
Id. at 1; see also Memorandum from Benjamin K. Phipps, Attorney, to Sharon Gallops,
DOR Tax Law Specialist (Aug. 1, 1997) (available at DOR, Tallahassee, Fla.). Mr. Phipps
commented that “property appraisers are presumed correct in their assessments
(determinations) of value. There is no presumption of correctness attached to the granting
or denying of either exemptions or classifications.” Id. at 1.
315. See 23 Fla. Admin. W. 6635, 6635 (Dec. 5, 1997) (“In response to timely written
comments received, the Department of Revenue has determined that the proposed rule
amendments require further review.”).
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B. Loss of the Presumption of Correctness
The presumption of correctness is lost if the taxpayer demonstrates that:
the property appraiser has failed to consider properly the criteria
in s. 193.011 or if the property appraiser’s assessment is arbitrarily based upon appraisal practices which are different from the appraisal practices generally applied by the property appraiser to
comparable property within the same class and within the same
county.316

These grounds for abrogating the property appraiser’s presumption of correctness are similar to, but slightly more expansive than,
current law.
The first basis for abrogating the presumption of correctness was
derived from Mastroianni and cases cited therein, which describe the
property appraiser’s obligation to consider, but not necessarily use,
each criterion in section 193.011, Florida Statutes.317 Interestingly,
the language proposed by the Task Force and approved by the Legislature in section 194.301, Florida Statutes, qualified this obligation
with the adverb “properly.”
Therefore, a question arises as to the meaning of the phrase “fail
to consider properly the criteria in s. 193.011.”318 The word “properly”
has been defined as “completely” or “in a thorough manner.” 319 Accordingly, the presumption of correctness will be lost if the appraiser
fails to “completely” or “thoroughly” consider each of the eight criteria in section 193.011, Florida Statutes.320 In this regard, the property appraiser must be prepared to demonstrate the extent to which
he considered each criterion; otherwise, the presumption of correctness afforded to his assessment may be lost.
The second basis for abrogating the presumption of correctness is
when the appraiser utilizes a methodology different from that used
to appraise similar property within the county. 321 In essence, this
316. FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997).
317. See Valencia Center, Inc. v. Bystrom, 543 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 1989); Blake v.
Xerox Corp., 447 So. 2d 1348, 1350 (Fla. 1984); Mastroianni v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 664
So. 2d 284, 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (citing Schultz v. TM Florida-Ohio Realty Partnership, 577 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1991)).
318. FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997) (emphasis added).
319. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 943 (1983).
320. Cf. Lanier v. Walt Disney World Co., 316 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
(noting that the property appraiser is not required to give each criterion equal weight
“PROVIDED EACH FACTOR IS FIRST CAREFULLY CONSIDERED”) (capitalization
original and emphasis added).
321. See FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997). Because of the reference only to intra-county
discrimination, see id., this basis likely will not apply to challenges to the assessment of
railroad property since such property is centrally assessed by DOR rather than the county
property appraiser. See id. § 193.085(4) (1997); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 12D-2 (1997).
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basis requires the taxpayer to demonstrate that the appraiser has
treated him differently in some manner. Interestingly, the taxpayer
is not required to demonstrate that this different treatment resulted
in an improper valuation of his property to overcome the property
appraiser’s presumption of correctness. However, the taxpayer would
be required to demonstrate that the appraisal is in excess of “just
value” to prevail in the challenge under section 194.301, Florida
Statutes.322
In this regard, this basis for abrogating the property appraiser’s
presumption of correctness was loosely based upon the “relative
equality and uniformity” theory announced in Camp Phosphate Co.
v. Allen.323 Under that theory, a taxpayer could successfully challenge his assessment by demonstrating that the appraiser used an
arbitrary method of valuing his property as compared to that used
for other properties, even if the taxpayer’s assessment was not in e xcess of fair market value .324 This theory sought to ensure that all
similarly situated property was assessed through the same appraisal
methods.325 Section 194.301, Florida Statutes, has that same goal.
However, because the taxpayer is still required to demonstrate that
the property appraiser’s assessment is “in excess of just value,” 326
section 194.301, Florida Statutes, revived the “spirit,” but not the
“body” of Camp Phosphate.327 Stated another way, section 194.301,
Florida Statutes, incorporated the “relative equality and uniformity”
concept from Camp Phosphate into the modern “over assessment”
challenge.

However, railroad property valuations are subject to other protections under federal laws.
See 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (1994).
322. See FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997). This is not to say that the taxpayer could not
successfully raise an equal protection-like challenge without proving that the assessment
is in excess of “just value.” See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Dade, 275 So. 2d
4, 10 (Fla. 1973). For a critical discussion of the Southern Bell decision, see FLORIDA
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, supra note 15, at 406-15.
323. 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503 (1919).
324. See id. at 349, 81 So. at 506; see also Southern Bell, 275 So. 2d at 10.
325. See Southern Bell, 275 So. 2d at 10. In this regard, the level of valuation—i.e.,
10%, 50%, or 100% of just value—was immaterial. See id.; see also FLORIDA STATE AND
LOCAL TAXES, supra note 15, § 8.05(2), at 368-71.
326. FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997).
327. The Florida Supreme Court receded from the Camp Phosphate holding in the
1940s. See Cosen Inv. Co. v. Overstreet, 154 Fla. 416, 416, 17 So. 2d 788, 788 (1944);
Schleman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 151 Fla. 96, 105, 9 So. 2d 197, 200 (1942).
Since then, the taxpayer has been required to demonstrate that his assessment exceeds
fair market value, notwithstanding the valuation of other properties. See generally
FLORIDA STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, supra note 15, § 8.05(2), at 372-76. But see Southern
Bell, 275 So. 2d at 10 (applying the Camp Phosphate decision).
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C. The New Burdens of Proof
Section 194.301, Florida Statutes, specifically rejected the “every
reasonable hypothesis” standard from Folsom and its progeny.328 In
this regard, taxpayers will no longer be required to disprove “every
reasonable hypothesis of a legal assessment” to overturn the property appraiser’s assessment.329 Instead, the taxpayer must only demonstrate that the assessment is in excess of “just value.”330
The amount of evidence that the taxpayer must produce to convince the fact-finder that its appraisal should be adopted in lieu of
the property appraiser’s depends upon the circumstances surrounding the appraisal. The taxpayer’s burden of proof is “clear and convincing evidence” unless the property appraiser’s presumption of
correctness was lost.331 Then, the taxpayer’s burden of proof is a
“preponderance of the evidence.”332
As a general rule, the “preponderance of the evidence” standard is
satisfied where evidence is presented that makes the truth of the
fact sought to be proved more probable than not .333 The “clear and
convincing evidence” standard is a more difficult standard of proof
and is satisfied where evidence is presented that results in reasonable certainty of the truth of the fact sought to be proved. 334 Therefore, to prevail in a challenge to the property appraiser’s assessment
where the presumption of correctness has not been lost, the taxpayer
must demonstrate that there is a “reasonable certainty” that his assessment is more reasonable—that is, more accurately reflects a
“just valuation” of the property—than that arrived at by the property
appraiser.
It is uncertain whether the burdens of proof in section 194.301,
Florida Statutes, were intended to apply in non-valuation cases—
cases where the taxpayer challenges the property appraiser’s denial
of the taxpayer’s entitlement to an exemption or denial of classified
328. See FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997); Folsom v. Bank of Greenwood, 97 Fla. 426, 42930, 120 So. 317, 319 (1925).
329. See FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997).
330. Section 194.304, Florida Statutes, reflects a dramatic policy shift for the disposition of tax challenge cases because under the procedure established in that law, those
cases will likely focus on the methodology used by the property appraiser in arriving at
the assessment. But see Bystrom v. Whitman, 488 So. 2d 520, 521 (Fla. 1986) (noting that
the core issue in tax challenge cases is the amount of the assessment). If the taxpayer’s
appraiser is able to convince the VAB or court that his methodology more accurately reflects a “just valuation” of the subject property than that utilized by the property appraiser, the property owner should prevail.
331. See FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997).
332. See id.
333. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “preponderance of the
evidence”).
334. See id. at 251. The “clear and convincing” standard will be met where the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable. See id.

1998]

AD VALOREM TAX VALUATION

231

status. As noted above, section 194.301, Florida Statutes, limits the
presumption of correctness to the property appraiser’s valuation determinations.335 Because that section defines the appropriate burden
of proof based upon whether the presumption of correctness is retained or lost, it is logical to assume that the Legislature did not intend the new burdens of proof to apply in non-valuation cases. 336 Accordingly, the existing standards applied in non-valuation cases
should continue to apply subject to the caveat in section 194.301,
Florida Statutes, which provides “[i]n no case shall the taxpayer
have the burden of proving that the property appraiser’s assessment
is not supported by any reasonable hypothesis of a legal assessment.”337
D. The Authority of the Court and the VAB to Establish the
Assessment Is Confirmed
The last two sentences in section 194.301, Florida Statutes, established the procedure the VAB or the court is to follow if the property appraiser’s assessment is “determined to be erroneous.” 338 If
there is competent substantial evidence that “cumulatively meets
the requirements of s. 193.011,” the VAB or the court may establish
the assessment.339 Otherwise, the VAB or the court must remand the
matter to the property appraiser to establish the assessment.340
The circuit court’s authority to establish the assessment has been
presumed to exist by courts and commentators. 341 DOR’s rules spe335. Compare FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997), with Fla. HB 557, § 1 (1996) (enrolled version).
336. See FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997). If, however, the issue is whether the property
appraiser correctly valued the property subject to the exemption or classified status, the
provisions of new section 194.301, Florida Statutes, should apply. Nothing in the Task
Force’s debate nor the legislative history of House Bill 445 suggests an intent to preclude
the use of the new standards in circumstances where the taxpayer’s challenge relates to
the appraiser’s valuation of classified or exempt property. See Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d
205, 306 (Fla. 1969) (discussing the valuation of classified use property).
337. FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997). The general rule applicable in non-valuation cases,
including those involving a denial of classified status, is that exemptions from taxation
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v.
Green, 110 So. 2d 409, 413 (Fla. 1959) (“While doubtful language in taxing statutes should
be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, the reverse is applicable in the construction of exceptions and exemptions from taxation.”); Jar Corp. v. Culberston, 246 So. 2d 144, 145 (Fla.
3d DCA 1971) (“[I]n order for a taxpayer to receive a benefit different in kind from other
taxpayers it is necessary for him to strictly comply with all conditions which would be
necessary to entitle him to the special treatment.”) (emphasis added); see also St. Petersburg Kennel Club v. Smith, 662 So. 2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (denying an agricultural classification).
338. FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997).
339. Id.
340. See id.
341. See FLORIDA STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, supra note 15, § 7.10, at 320f-g (“In the
context of whether a court can determine a lawful assessment by striking the illegal por-
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cifically recognize the VAB’s authority to establish the assessment. 342
Thus, it could be argued that these two sentences merely intended to
clarify and codify the court’s authority under existing law. It may be
argued, however, that allowing the court to establish the assessment
infringes upon the legislative powers delegated to county property
appraisers.343 Viewed in this manner, the last two sentences in section 194.301, Florida Statutes, may be unconstitutional. Alternatively, this language may simply be viewed as direction to the court
to enjoin the collection of that portion of the assessment that exceeds
the “just value.”344 To determine the amount to be enjoined, however,
the court necessarily must determine the “just value” of the property.
In this regard, the last two sentences in section 194.301, Florida
Statutes, prescribed the circumstances in which the court may345 do
so.346 If this language is viewed as an extension of existing law, this
tion without a statute expressly stating so, the current statutes would likely be construed
as providing such authority, although the courts have not directly addressed the question.”); see also Simpson v. Merrill, 234 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. 1970); Cassady v. McKinney,
343 So. 2d 955, 957 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Palm Springs Dev. Corp. v. Dade County, 229 So.
2d 629, 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). But see Walker v. Trump, 549 So. 2d 1098, 1104 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1989).
342. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003(5)(b) (1997). But see id. r. 12D10.003(1) (“The board has no power to fix the original valuation of property for ad valorem
tax purposes . . . .”) (emphasis added).
343. It has been noted that:
[A court] has no power to apportion the tax or to make a new assessment, or to
direct another to be made by the proper officers of the State. These officers,
and the manner in which they shall exercise their functions, are wholly beyond
the power of the court when so acting. The levy of taxes is not a judicial function. Its exercise . . . is exclusively legislative.
A court of equity is, therefore, hampered in the exercise of its jurisdiction by
the necessity of enjoining the tax complained of, in whole or in part, without
any power of doing complete justice by making, or causing to be made, a new
assessment on any principle it may decide to be the right one.
State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 614-15 (1875). Florida courts, for the most part,
have ignored this prohibition. See, e.g., Folsom v. Bank of Greenwood, 97 Fla. 426, 431-32,
120 So. 317, 319 (1925) (holding that the court should enjoin the collection of that portion
of an assessment found to be excessive but allow the collection of the portion that reflects
what the court finds to be a proper valuation). But see Cassady v. McKinney, 343 So. 2d
955, 957 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (reversing a trial court adjustment of appraisal); see also FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 12D-10.003(1) (1997).
344. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 196.01 (1967) (expressly authorizing the court to set aside all or
any part of the assessment). This language was repealed in 1969. See Act effective June
25, 1969, ch. 69-140, § 6, 1969 Fla. Laws 668, 672. It has been suggested that current section 194.171(1), Florida Statutes, provides broader jurisdiction than section 196.01, Florida Statutes (1967). See FLORIDA STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, supra note 15, § 7.10, at 320f.
345. It is important to note that the language authorizing the VAB or the court to establish the assessment is permissive, not mandatory. See FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1997).
346. The requirement in section 194.301, Florida Statutes, that there be sufficient
evidence in the record upon which the VAB or court can determine “just value” is consistent with the following passage from Cassady:
In fixing tax assessments the trial court is required to have competent substantial evidence in the record as to the manner, extent or degree such factors
bear upon the valuation. If there is competent evidence before the trial court in
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latter interpretation is more consistent with the legislative history of
section 194.301, Florida Statutes,347 and is supported by public policy
considerations.348 Therefore, whether this component of section
194.301, Florida Statutes, is viewed as a codification or an extension
of existing law, it should be constitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the Committee Substitute for House Bill 445 reflected a
fundamental change in policy with respect to challenging ad valorem
tax assessments. It was not the intent of the new section 194.301,
Florida Statutes, to infringe upon the property appraiser’s role in assessing property for ad valorem tax purposes. Nor was its intent to
encourage ad valorem tax litigation. Instead, it was intended to further the constitutional mandate that property subject to taxation be
assessed at no more than “just value.”
More importantly, however, the new burdens of proof codified in
section 194.301, Florida Statutes, were intended to address the perceived inequities in the current ad valorem tax challenge process
that were brought to the forefront during the 1996 and 1997 Regular
Sessions. Whether this provision will, in fact, restore taxpayers’ confidence in the process depends upon how it is interpreted and applied by the VABs and the courts. If they fail to implement the new
standards in an equitable manner, the legislative intent of section
194.301, Florida Statutes, will be frustrated, and the two years of
work and study that went into the provision will have been for
naught.

this regard it certainly is free to accept that [assessment] which is most believable or compromise between two extremes as it deems the facts and circumstances warrant. It may thereupon make the necessary calculations or adjustments. Otherwise there could not be a ready resolution of a tax assessment
where the tax assessor consistently fails or declines to consider such requirements. In the absence of such evidence the trial court cannot substitute its
own independent judgment, no matter how enlightened or realistic.
Cassady, 343 So. 2d at 957.
347. In developing the language that would become section 194.301, Florida Statues,
the Task Force recognized that requiring the VAB or the court to remand the matter to
the property appraiser “can be a cumbersome and time-consuming process.” LOGUE
PROPOSAL, supra note 204, at 2.
348. See FLORIDA STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, supra note 15, § 7.10 at 320h-i
(“Procedurally, the potential for unwarranted delay is a fundamental difficulty with the
concept of remand to the property appraiser from both the [VAB] and circuit court.”).

